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A growing theoretical and research literature suggests that trait and state social 
anxiety can predict attentional patterns in the presence of emotional stimuli. The current 
study addressed some inconsistencies and gaps in the literature using eye tracking 
methodology. Participants with high and low trait social anxiety were randomly assigned 
to either give a speech or to watch a video of another individual delivering a speech (state 
social anxiety manipulation). Next, participants were asked to engage in a free view task 
in which pairs of emotional facial stimuli (angry-happy, angry-neutral, or happy-neutral) 
were presented for 3 s. Eye movements were monitored continuously. Results revealed 
that individuals with high trait social anxiety are faster to make their first fixation on 
neutral and positive stimuli on trials that contain threatening stimuli, and that they are 
faster to disengage attention from threatening stimuli after their initial fixation on trials 
that contain neutral stimuli than low trait social anxiety participants. The trait social 
anxiety groups do not differ with regard to how often their attention returns to emotional 
stimuli or to how long they attend to emotional stimuli over the course of the trial. State 
social anxiety influences how often attention returns to each type of stimulus and the 
duration of the fixations on each type of stimulus. State social anxiety does not influence 
the timing or duration of the first fixation on emotional stimuli. Results are discussed in 
 
 
reference to the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis and basic attentional processes. 
Treatment implications, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research are 
also discussed.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Social anxiety, which involves the fear of being negatively evaluated in social and 
performance situations, is a normal transient experience for most people. However, some 
people experience more intense and frequent social anxiety than others, in a broader 
range of situations, and it interferes with their lives. Social anxiety disorder (also known 
as social phobia), the diagnostic term for someone who suffers from excessive anxiety in 
situations with the potential for negative evaluation from others (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), has been found to have a lifetime prevalence rate of over 10% 
(Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005). The experience of anxiety and 
avoidance behaviors that characterize the disorder lead to a poorer quality of life than 
individuals without social anxiety disorder as it detrimentally affects the interpersonal 
(including both platonic and romantic relationships), educational, familial, occupational, 
and emotional realms (Katzelnick et al., 2001; Schneier et al., 1994). Additionally, 
researchers have found substantial comorbidity between social anxiety disorder and other 
mental disorders including other anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and substance abuse 
(Chartier, Walker, & Stein, 2003), with the onset of social anxiety often preceding the 
onset of the mood disorder (Stein et al., 2001) or substance dependence (Buckner, 
Schmidt, Lang, Small, Schlauch, & Lewinsohn, 2008). The high prevalence of social 
anxiety disorder, as well as the suffering associated with it, highlights the need for 
research that leads to effective interventions.  
Fortunately, effective interventions for social anxiety disorder exist (for meta-
analytical evidence see Chambless & Hope, 1996; Fedoroff & Taylor, 2001; Feske & 
Chambless, 1995; Hofmann & Smits, 2008; Norton & Price, 2007; Powers, Sigmarsson, 
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& Emmelkamp, 2008; Taylor, 1996). However, empirical studies of treatment response 
consistently indicate that there is a substantial group of treatment non-responders 
associated with both psychosocial and psychopharmacological treatments (e.g., 
Heimberg, Liebowitz, Hope, Schneier, Holt, Welkowitz, et al., 1998). In order to develop 
more effective interventions for social anxiety disorder, it is necessary to better 
understand the nature of the processes that underlie social anxiety.  
As will be discussed later, many theoretical conceptualizations of anxiety have 
implicated attentional processes, including attention to threat, as playing an important 
role in the development and maintenance of anxiety. For example, Barlow (2000) 
hypothesized that the presence of a cue associated with threat initiates a series of 
reactions that result in the experience of anxiety. Theories of the etiology and 
maintenance of social anxiety (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 2007) have reached conclusions 
that are similar to the conclusions of broader theories (e.g., Barlow, 2000). In addition, 
empirical evidence suggests that attentional patterns change concurrently with social 
anxiety symptoms (e.g., Lundh & Öst, 2001), supporting the hypothesis that attention and 
anxiety are related constructs. Despite the theoretical importance of attention in models 
of anxiety and the empirical evidence of an association between attentional patterns and 
anxiety, few treatments attempt to directly alter attentional processes (although many 
indirectly influence attention; for a notable exception see Clark et al., 2003).  
Recently, empirical investigations of interventions based solely on the 
modification of attention to threat have been conducted and there is at least some 
evidence for the efficacy of those types of interventions with individuals with social 
anxiety disorder (Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Li, Tan, Qian, & Liu, 
 
 
3
2008; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). However, in order for psychologists 
to continue to refine interventions for social anxiety that aim to alter attentional 
processes, more information concerning the maladaptive attentional processes should be 
gathered.  
Despite the large number of research studies investigating patterns of attention to 
threat for individuals with high levels of social anxiety disorder, there are a number of 
gaps in the literature. First, there is controversy regarding the vigilance-avoidance pattern 
of attention to threat hypothesized to characterize the attentional patterns of individuals 
with high levels of social anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004). As will be 
discussed later, some empirical research supports the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis and 
suggests that anxious individuals initially orient towards, but subsequently avoid, highly 
threatening, anxiety-provoking stimuli (Mogg, Bradley et al., 2004). However, some 
studies have failed to find evidence that anxiety influences attention to threat (e.g., 
Esteves, 1999; Fox et al., 2000). In addition, studies of the time course of the attentional 
process that occur when anxious individuals are presented with threat have provided 
inconsistent results. Second, there is debate in the attention to threat literature concerning 
whether social anxiety is better characterized as associated with attention to threat or 
attention to emotional stimuli in general. Research suggests that state anxiety predicts 
attention to emotional stimuli, whereas trait anxiety predicts attention to threatening 
stimuli (e.g., Rutherford, MacLeod, and Campbell, 2004). Third, the cognitive processes 
that underlie the patterns of attention to threat that have been associated with social 
anxiety have been debated. In particular, it is unclear whether individuals with social 
anxiety exhibit an attentional bias towards threat because threatening stimuli draw their 
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attention more quickly (Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005) or if they have 
difficulty disengaging their attention from threatening stimuli (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & 
Przeworski, 2003). Fourth, it is not clear whether patterns of attention to threat associated 
with social anxiety are due to social anxiety per se, or if the effects of negative affect can 
provide a better explanation for the findings.  
The purpose of this dissertation research is to provide an overview of the 
theoretical and empirical literature relevant to attention to threat and social anxiety. The 
literature review will include a discussion of methodological problems in previous 
studies. In addition, this dissertation addresses some of the inconsistencies in the 
literature. Specifically, this dissertation explores questions relevant to the vigilance-
avoidance hypothesis, and the effects of state and trait anxiety on attention to threatening 
and other emotional stimuli, while controlling for negative affect. Also, this dissertation 
provides insight into the cognitive processes responsible for patterns of attention to 
threat.  
1.1. Models of Attention to Threat and the Maintenance of Anxiety 
There are a number of models of anxiety that associate attentional processes with 
the development and maintenance of anxiety. The current section will describe four of 
these models. Two of the models are relevant to anxiety in general and two of the models 
are specific to social anxiety.  
1.1a. The Process of Anxious Apprehension (Barlow, 2000).  
Barlow (2000), in an overview and update of his conceptualization presented in 
Barlow (1988), asserted that attention plays an important role in the elicitation of anxiety. 
He postulated that anxiety (or anxious apprehension) is the product of the activation of 
 
 
5
cognitive-affective structures located in our defensive motivational system that facilitate 
attention for threat.  
According to the theory, the presence of a cue associated with threat initiates the 
process that results in the experience of anxiety. The cue triggers physical tension and 
arousal, as well as negative affect. Increased physiological arousal associated with 
anxiety includes accelerated heart rate, blushing, and sweating (Turk, Lerner, Heimberg, 
& Rapee, 2001). The tension and arousal physically prepare the individual for negotiating 
a threatening situation and the negative affect is the result of the uncertainty that the 
individual will be able to deal effectively with or control an impending threatening 
situation. In support of the idea that uncertainty is an important factor in the development 
of anxiety, there is evidence to suggest that individuals with an anxiety disorder exhibit 
less physiological reactivity to predictable, as opposed to unpredictable, threatening cues 
(Fonteyne, Vervliet, Hermans, Baeyens,& Vansteenwegen, 2009; Grillon, et al., 2008). 
In an effort to evaluate the individual’s ability to handle the future threat 
effectively, there is a switch from focusing on threatening cues to focusing on aspects of 
the self (such as physiological state). The shift in attention leads to an intensification of 
arousal and negative affect. Empirical evidence has supported the presence of an internal 
bias for individuals experiencing social anxiety. For example, Mansell, Clark, and Ehlers 
(2003) reported that, when asked to respond to both external (e.g., facial stimuli) and 
internal (i.e., pulsing of the participant’s finger) cues, participants with high social 
anxiety showed a greater bias towards attending to the internal cue than low anxious 
participants when threatened.  
 
 
6
Furthermore, there is evidence that perceived changes in physiology can affect 
anxiety. For example, in a study by Wild, Clark, Ehlers, and McManus (2008), 
participants wore equipment that they believed provided them feedback concerning their 
state of physiological arousal. In reality, the participants received false feedback. 
Participants who believed that their physiological arousal had increased reported more 
anxiety, poorer perceptions of their performance during a conversation, and perceptions 
of greater visibility of their anxiety than the participants who believed that their 
physiological response had decreased over time.  
According to Barlow (2000), following the focus on physiological state, there is 
another shift of attention towards threatening cues and attention is focused more narrowly 
on threat. Barlow (2000) asserted that, while in a threatening situation, an individual can 
cope by avoiding. There is some empirical evidence that anxious individuals avoid threat 
following their attention to it (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 2005). One implication of the theory is 
that anxiety can be adaptive. Anxiety appears to stimulate a concern with the 
uncontrollability and unpredictability of a possible future negative event. This concern 
produces a negative affective reaction and the unwanted presence of the negative affect 
serves as motivation for the individual to prepare to deal with the threatening situation. 
One avoidance mechanism is worry, which simultaneously allows the individual to avoid 
negative affect and to plan possible resolutions to their dilemma (Borkovec, Alcaine, & 
Behar, 2004; Szabó & Lovibond, 2006). Therefore, anxiety, like other emotions, has 
evolved as an innate pattern of responding because it has been useful throughout human 
history as a promoter of survival.  
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1.1b. Threat Evaluation System (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998)  
Like Barlow (2000), Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) presented a model to 
explain the role of anxiety in the detection of threat and the selective processing of 
threatening stimuli. The authors contended that their theory improved upon a number of 
prior theories of the patterns of attention to threat associated with anxiety (i.e., Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Ohman, 1993; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988;). The theory posited the presence of a threat evaluation system (TES) 
that serves to increase the saliency of threatening information prior to conscious 
awareness based on stimulus properties, priming effects, and stored meanings of the 
stimulus. Furthermore, cognitive processes, such as worry and interpretation biases, serve 
to maintain high levels of vigilance for people with high anxiety (Mathews, 1990). 
Therefore, consistent with evidence from visual search tasks (e.g., Esteves, 1999), threat 
is detected more quickly and easily than non-threatening stimuli. The increase in saliency 
for threatening information is especially adaptive in the presence of more than one 
stimulus because the threatening information receives processing priority over non-
threatening stimuli.  
According to Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), both trait and state anxiety levels 
modulate the determination of saliency of threat such that more anxious individuals 
assign a higher importance to threatening information than non-anxious individuals. 
Indeed, the results of a number of research studies on attention to threat have suggested 
that individuals with high trait anxiety exhibit an attentional bias towards threat, in 
comparison to low trait anxiety individuals (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 
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1998), and that high state anxiety exaggerates the difference between the groups (e.g., 
Lee & Telch, 2008).  
Threatening information is more salient for anxious individuals than for non-
anxious individuals because anxious individuals are thought to have a lower threshold for 
TES output and a greater number of stored representations of threat due to their greater 
ability to associate stimuli with punishment. In support of this assertion, learning studies 
have shown that high anxiety individuals learn some information better through the use 
of punishment, whereas low anxiety individuals exhibited difficulty learning through the 
use of punishment (Corr, Pickering, & Gray, 1997).  
Furthermore, Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) asserted that, following the 
detection of threat, the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS; Gray & McNaughton, 1996) 
causes physiological arousal and the allocation of attention to threat, which disrupts 
ongoing behavior and promotes survival. Increased physiological arousal associated with 
anxiety includes accelerated heart rate, blushing, and sweating (Turk et al., 2001) and the 
perception of physiological arousal has been shown to have a negative effect on quality 
of task performance (Wild et al., 2008). Consistent with Barlow’s (2000) model, 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) proposed that the physiological arousal associated with 
anxiety has adaptive value as it prepares the body for fight or flight (Mathews et al., 
1997).  
Finally, according to Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), the individual 
incorporates aspects of the environment into their stored representations of threatening 
stimuli, making it more likely that the individual will exhibit anxiety when they 
encounter similar stimuli in the future. This assertion is consistent with leading theories 
 
 
9
concerning anxiety and the activation of fear-relevant stimuli (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 
2006; Foa & Kozak, 1986). 
1.1c. A Cognitive Model (Clark & Wells, 1995) 
Clark and Wells (1995) outlined the cognitive and behavioral events that occur 
when an individual experiences social anxiety. The model suggests that the process of 
experiencing social anxiety begins in the presence of an audience. When the individual 
encounters the audience, they activate dysfunctional beliefs. These beliefs might include 
the ideas that others have high standards of expected behavior set for them and that they 
are at risk for not acting in accordance with those standards. In addition, there will be 
negative consequences for not behaving in an appropriate manner, including social 
rejection and negative affect. Foa, Franklin, Perry, and Herbert (1996) reported evidence 
of these dysfunctional beliefs in a study of individuals with social anxiety disorder.  
The perception of the social danger leads to physiological arousal and the 
activation of an “anxiety programme.” The “anxiety programme” leads the individual to 
switch their attention to the self as the object of attention, with an emphasis on the 
individual’s physiological state. Then, the individual uses information derived from their 
physiological sensations to evaluate how he or she appears to others, believing this 
evaluation to be correct. Instead of using information from others with whom the 
individual is interacting, the individual uses information derived from the experience of 
anxiety, thus biasing their own self-image and leading to more anxiety. In turn, the 
increase in anxiety is likely to lead the individual to believe that the social dangers are 
even greater.  
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According to Clark and Wells (1995), social anxiety is maintained through a 
number of processes. For example, the process of focusing on oneself consumes 
cognitive resources such that there might not be enough resources to complete the task at 
hand. If anxiety interferes with task completion, then the individual has evidence of their 
insufficient behavior. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that anxiety does interfere with 
task completion (Wild et al., 2008). Similarly, if many cognitive resources are being used 
for self-focused attention, then there are fewer resources available to process the positive 
reaction of others. The only information about the individual’s performance comes from 
the individual’s process of focusing on the self. Consistent with this assertion, research 
suggests that observers rate the performance of anxious speakers more highly than the 
speakers rate themselves (Wild et al., 2008).  
In addition, socially anxious individuals often engage in safety behaviors that are 
enacted with the goal of making negative evaluation less likely (McManus, Sacadura, & 
Clark, 2008). For example, if an individual is afraid that they will fall while walking up a 
flight of stairs, they might proceed very slowly up the stairs. Despite their common use, 
individuals with social anxiety might have knowledge that safety behaviors can be 
interpreted as negative by others (Vassilopoulos, 2009). These types of safety behaviors 
also use cognitive resources, again making successful task completion and the 
recognition of positive feedback less likely (McManus et al., 2008). Finally, individuals 
might attribute their success in a situation to the presence of a safety behavior, as opposed 
to their own social competence.  
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1.1d. A Cognitive-Behavioral Model (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997)  
Like Clark and Wells (1995), Rapee and Heimberg (1997) provided a cognitive-
behavioral model of social anxiety disorder. Their model emphasizes the perceptual and 
information processing activities of an individual when confronted with the possibility of 
social evaluation and how distortions in those processes lead to the elevation and 
maintenance of social anxiety. According to the model, the chain of events that leads to 
social anxiety begins when the individual perceives an audience with the potential to 
evaluate the individual and forms a mental representation of themselves from the 
perspective of the audience. Individuals with social anxiety disorder are more likely than 
nonanxious individuals to view themselves from the perspective of an observer (Coles, 
Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998) and this difference in 
perspective taking is specific to social situations that involve high levels of anxiety 
(Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Wells, Clark, Ahmad, 1998). For individuals 
with social anxiety disorder, the observer perspective becomes more prominent as time 
elapses (up to three weeks; Coles et al., 2002), however, the increase in the observer 
perspective is not seen with non-anxious controls (Coles et al., 2002). 
Various sources of information contribute to the formation of the baseline image 
of the self including pre-existing images of the self, previous feedback from others, and 
prior experiences that are stored in long-term memory (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 
2000). However, the baseline image is not static. Instead, in the presence of the perceived 
audience, the individual updates the mental representation of the self using information 
from the perception of internal cues, such as the physiological symptoms of anxiety (e.g., 
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increased heart rate), and external cues, such as audience feedback (e.g., frowning, 
laughter).  
Unfortunately, the mental images that individuals with social anxiety disorder 
form are more negative than the images formed by control individuals (Hackmann et al., 
1998) and are thought to play a causal role in the maintenance of social anxiety disorder 
(Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003). The Rapee and Heimberg model explains 
the prevalence of negative mental images in individuals with social anxiety disorder by 
asserting that individuals with social anxiety disorder tend to allocate attentional 
resources toward both internal and external sources of threat as has been shown in a 
various experimental studies using attention tasks (e.g., Mansell et al., 2003). The biased 
attentional patterns are thought to lead to the development of a more negative mental 
image. Furthermore, the combination of the negative self-imagery and interpretation bias 
results in greater deficits than the results of either mechanism acting alone and they serve 
to maintain the disorder (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006).   
Following the formation of the mental representation of the self, the individual 
with social anxiety compares their mental representation to the expectations that the 
individual believes that the audience holds based on both situational and audience 
characteristics (Mahone, Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The 
resulting estimation of the likelihood of negative evaluation is the discrepancy between 
one’s mental representation and the expected standards of the audience. Individuals with 
social anxiety disorder usually expect that negative evaluation is probable and that the 
consequences are great (Foa et al., 1996).  
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The expected negative evaluation results in the behavioral, cognitive, and physical 
symptoms of social anxiety. The behavioral resultants of social anxiety disorder can be 
obvious, such as the avoidance or escape of social situations, or understated behaviors, 
such as the avoidance of eye contact (Turk et al., 2001). The cognitive symptoms of 
social anxiety disorder are comprised of the thoughts of negative evaluation that are 
formed in social situations (Turk et al., 2001), such as “They will think that I am stupid,” 
or “I am a loser.” Finally, physical symptoms of social anxiety disorder typically involve 
increased physiological arousal, including accelerated heart rate, blushing, and sweating 
(Turk et al., 2001). 
1.1e. Summary  
There are at least two commonalities among the models described above that are 
relevant to the current study. First, in each of the models, the experience of anxiety is 
directly related to the detection of threat. The relationship is thought to be bidirectional; 
the detection of threat has been hypothesized to cause anxiety and the presence of anxiety 
has been hypothesized to facilitate the detection of threat. Second, many of the models 
suggest that anxiety (and the accompanying arousal) is intensified through attentional 
focus on threat and decreased when attention is allocated toward less threatening 
behaviors. For example, an individual’s anxiety is thought to increase when focusing on 
their uncomfortable physiological state, but to decrease while engaging in safety 
behaviors.  
In support of the aforementioned theories of anxiety, empirical evidence from a 
variety of methodologies suggests that attentional biases are associated with social 
anxiety disorder. An overview of that literature is presented below with an emphasis on 
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the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis, the effects of state and trait anxiety, as well as 
negative affect, the cognitive processes responsible to the vigilance-avoidance pattern of 
attention to threat, and the methodologies used to examine attention to threat.  
1.2. Empirical Evaluation of the Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis  
According to the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis, highly anxious individuals are 
initially hyper-vigilant for threat, but subsequently avoid the threat at longer exposure 
durations (Mogg, Bradley et al., 2004). This section contains a review of the empirical 
evidence pertaining to the assertions of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis, with an 
emphasis on studies using highly socially anxious participants. As will be argued below, 
the empirical data are mixed with regard to support of the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis. The seemingly inconsistent results are not surprising given that there is great 
variation among the methodological aspects of the relevant studies.  
Vassilopoulos (2005) reported evidence of an attentional pattern consistent with 
the vigilance-avoidance pattern using a sample of undergraduates selected for having 
high or low levels of social anxiety. Participants in the study completed measures of 
social anxiety and mood, as well as a task designed to assess attention to threat. 
Participants were told that they would give a speech that would be recorded and 
evaluated later. This manipulation was designed to increase state social anxiety prior to 
the start of the attention task.  
The attention task was a variation of the dot probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986) conducted on a computer. The task included 144 experimental trials. At 
the start of each trial, a cross appeared in the center of the computer screen for 500 ms 
and participants were asked to focus their attention on the cross. Next, a neutral word and 
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an emotional word appeared side by side on the computer screen. The words were 
matched for length. The emotional word was a social-threat, a positive-social, or a 
physical-threat word. The stimuli remained for 200 ms on half of the trials and for 500 
ms on the other half of the trials. Immediately following the disappearance of the stimuli, 
a probe appeared in a place formerly occupied by one of the two words. The participants’ 
task was to indicate the location of the probe by pressing one of two response buttons that 
corresponded with the location of the probe. Word types appeared with equal frequency 
and the emotional words appeared on the right side of the screen for 50% of the trials and 
on the left side of the screen on the remaining trials.  
For each trial, a bias score was calculated. The bias score served was a measure of 
reaction speeding when the probe replaced the emotional word, as opposed to when it 
replaced the neutral word. The theory is that, if an individual were allocating attention 
towards the emotional word, then they should be faster to respond to a probe that appears 
in the location formerly occupied by the emotional word because an attentional shift is 
not necessary. If the participant were attending to the neutral word, then they would be 
slower to attend to a probe that appeared in the location formerly occupied by the 
emotional word because, in order to attend to that stimulus, the individual would have to 
disengage their attention from the location of the neutral word and reorient to the location 
formerly occupied by the emotional word.  
The study demonstrated that individuals with high levels of social anxiety were 
initially vigilant for emotional words (at 200 ms), although individuals who had low 
levels of social anxiety did not show an attentional bias during that time frame. In 
addition, the authors reported that individuals with high levels of social anxiety 
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subsequently avoided the emotional stimuli (at 500 ms), but that individuals with low 
levels of social anxiety did not exhibit an attentional bias at that time point either.  
Consistent with Vassilopoulos (2005), Mogg and Bradley (2002) presented 
evidence that individuals with high social anxiety exhibit an early vigilance for 
threatening stimuli. Researchers asked participants with high and low social anxiety to 
complete a variation of the dot-probe task. On each trial of the task, participants were 
presented with a fixation point in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. Next, a pair of 
faces was presented for 17 ms. On critical trials, one face was threatening and one face 
was neutral. A pair of masks was presented for 68 ms immediately following the pairs of 
faces. Then, a probe appeared in a location formerly occupied by one of the masks. The 
task of the participants was to identify the location of the probe (left or right) via a 
keyboard response. Participants with high levels of social anxiety were faster to identify 
the location of the probes that replaced the masked threat. Results suggested that 
individuals with high levels of social anxiety attend quickly to threatening information, 
even when that information might not be accessible in consciousness.  
Similarly, Chen, Ehlers, Clark, and Mansell (2002) found evidence that 
individuals with social anxiety disorder avoid threatening stimuli 500 ms after the onset 
of the stimuli. Both individuals with social anxiety disorder and control participants 
participated in a variation of the dot probe paradigm. The task consisted of 96 trials. At 
the start of each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 1000 ms. Then, a picture of a 
face (displaying a neutral, positive, or negative expression) and a picture of a household 
object appeared in positions that were diagonal from each other for 500 ms. Then, the 
pictures were replaced by either an “E” or an “F.” The participants’ task was to identify 
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the letter by pressing the appropriate button on a response box. The participants were 
informed that the probe could only appear in one of the locations in which a stimulus 
appeared on that trial.  
Bias scores were calculated based on the idea that slower reaction times on trials 
during which the probe replaced the household object than on trials when the probe 
replaced the facial image are an indication of attention to faces. Chen et al. (2002) 
reported that individuals with social anxiety disorder directed their attention away from 
facial stimuli that were positive, neutral, or negative when the stimuli were presented 
simultaneously with images of household objects (Chen et al., 2002). The control group 
did not exhibit any attentional biases.  
The decision to use a symbol identification task, as opposed to a symbol location 
task, was made in hopes of maximizing the differences between the groups (Chen et al., 
2002). The use of the symbol identification task impairs the ability of an individual to 
identify the probe when their attention is not directed in the area occupied by the probe. 
In other words, the stimulus location task can be completed using peripheral vision, while 
the stimulus identification task cannot. Therefore, the stimulus identification task requires 
more focused attention.   
At first glance, these findings might appear to be in opposition to the predictions 
of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis because the participants directed their attention 
away from neutral facial expressions that might not be considered threatening. However, 
one might argue that facial expressions, regardless of valence, are threatening to 
individuals with social anxiety disorder because they essentially fear other people. In fact, 
at least one functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study reported differences 
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between individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder and healthy controls with 
regard to amygdala activation when presented with neutral faces (Cooney, Atlas, 
Joormann, Eugène, & Gotlib, 2006). Therefore, it might be accurate to conclude that 
individuals with social anxiety disorder exhibit an attentional bias towards and/or away 
from (depending on the time course) facial stimuli in general, and that the bias is even 
greater when the facial stimulus is displaying a threatening expression.      
Vassilopoulos (2005), as well as Chen et al. (2002), documented evidence of 
avoidance of emotional stimuli for individuals with high social anxiety at 500 ms after 
the onset of the stimuli. In contrast, a number of studies have reported an attentional bias 
towards threat at 500 ms after the onset of the stimuli. For example, Mogg, Philippot, and 
Bradley (2004) asked participants with social anxiety disorder and control participants 
with no history of psychological difficulties to participate in a computerized dot probe 
task. There were 160 experimental trials and each trial started with the presentation of a 
central fixation for 500 ms. Then, two facial stimuli were presented simultaneously. The 
facial stimuli were neutral, angry, or happy and appeared for either 500 or 1,250 ms. The 
neutral face was always presented with the emotional faces. Next, the stimuli disappeared 
and an arrow that pointed either up or down replaced one of the stimuli. The participants’ 
task was to indicate, via a response box, in which direction the arrow was pointing. 
Attentional bias scores were calculated using response times in a way that was similar to 
Chen et al. (2002). The authors reported that the social anxiety disorder group exhibited 
an attentional bias towards threat at 500 ms, relative to the other stimuli types, but that 
there was no bias for the social anxiety disorder participants at 1,250 ms. 
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As another example, Pishyar, Harris, and Menzies (2004) asked participants with 
high and low levels of social anxiety to participate in two dot probe tasks. In one task, the 
stimuli were positive, negative, or neutral words. In the other task, the stimuli were 
positive, negative, or neutral facial stimuli. Each task consisted of 40 trials that started 
with the presentation of a fixation point for 500 ms. Next, a positive or a negative 
stimulus was presented simultaneously with a neutral stimulus for 500 ms. Then, a probe 
appeared to which the participants had to respond. Threat biases were calculated 
according to MacLeod and Mathews (1988). Essentially, the formulas provided in 
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) are based on the comparison of reaction times between 
trials in which the probe and the emotional face appeared in the same location and the 
trials in which the probe and the emotional face appeared in opposite locations. Slower 
reaction times to probes appearing in the location opposite of the emotional stimulus, as 
opposed to the stimuli appearing the same location as the emotional stimulus, would 
suggest a bias towards emotional stimuli. The authors reported that the high social 
anxiety group exhibited an attentional bias towards threat on the task that used the facial 
stimuli, but that no bias was present for the word task or for other emotional stimuli.       
Similarly, Sposari and Rapee (2007) reported evidence of an attentional bias 
towards facial expressions, regardless of type of emotion displayed. In two studies, 
participants with social anxiety disorder and control participants engaged in a dot probe 
task under the threat that they would have to soon deliver a speech. The dot probe task 
consisted of 96 trials. Each trial started with a 1 second fixation cross. Next, the 
researchers presented images of household objects and facial expressions (negative, 
neutral, or positive) simultaneously in diagonal positions. Participants were asked to 
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identify a probe that replaced the stimuli 500 ms following the onset of the stimuli as 
either an “E” or an “F”. Bias scores were calculated and results indicated that individuals 
with social anxiety disorder exhibit an attentional bias towards facial expressions, 
regardless of the emotion displayed.  
Research supporting the idea that individuals with social anxiety are vigilant for 
threat has been completed using methods with seemingly greater external validity. For 
example, Perowne and Mansell (2002) asked individuals high and low in social anxiety to 
give a speech while viewing an audience on a monitor who they believed to be watching 
them. The audience exhibited positive (e.g., leaning forward) and negative (e.g., 
yawning) behaviors. Following the speech, participants were shown a picture of the 
audience and were asked to indicate which behaviors the audience exhibited. The high 
social anxiety group demonstrated a bias towards noticing the negative behaviors, 
whereas the low social anxiety group primarily attended to the positive social behaviors. 
As another example, Veljaca and Rapee (1998) conducted a study in which they asked 
participants to give a speech in front of an audience and to indicate via a response button 
when they noticed an audience member engaging in negative or positive social behaviors. 
They found that highly socially anxious individuals detected more negative and less 
positive social behaviors. 
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, other studies have provided evidence 
that some stimuli produce similar reactions across individuals, regardless of anxiety. In a 
visual search task, Esteves (1999) asked individuals with both high and low levels of 
social anxiety to examine an display containing facial stimuli to determine if a face that 
was not consistent with the other faces was present (e.g., an angry face among happy 
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faces). In general, participants more quickly identified inconsistent angry faces than 
inconsistent neutral or happy faces, however, no response time differences between the 
groups were found. Using a very similar visual search task, Fox et al. (2000) also found 
that individuals tend to identify inconsistent angry faces more quickly than inconsistent 
happy faces. Findings suggested that detection of threat is a process that receives 
processing priority in many individuals, including individuals with low levels of anxiety.  
A number of studies have documented the existence of a vigilance for or an 
avoidance of threat associated with social anxiety (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 2005), but there 
are several inconsistencies among the studies. First, some authors reported vigilance for 
threat 500 ms following the onset of the threatening stimulus (Mogg, Philippot et al., 
2004), whereas others reported avoidance of threat at that time for individuals with high 
levels of social anxiety (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 2005). Second, some authors reported that 
the attentional biases associated with social anxiety were specific to threatening stimuli 
(Pishyar et al., 2004), while some authors reported that the attentional bias associated 
with social anxiety was not specific to threat (Chen et al., 2002). It is important to 
discover the factors responsible for the variation in findings across the studies as it might 
influence the way in which we conceptualize the role of attention in the etiology and/or 
maintenance of social anxiety and have treatment implications.  
1.3. Attention Modification-Based Treatment 
As a reaction to the finding that individuals with high levels of social anxiety 
exhibit different patterns of attention to threat than individuals with low levels of social 
anxiety, and to findings that the modification of attentional patterns can affect anxiety 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; for an exception see 
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Harris & Menzies, 1998), a number of researchers have developed treatments for social 
anxiety based on the modification of attention to threat. For example, Amir et al. (2008) 
reported evidence of the efficacy of a treatment based on attention modification. The 
researchers recruited undergraduates who reported both difficulty giving speeches and a 
high score on a measure of social anxiety. After completing a number of questionnaires, 
including a measure of state anxiety, participants engaged in a computerized task 
designed to measure the individual’s attention to threat.  
The task was a modified version of the Posner paradigm (Posner, 1980) that 
contained 192 trials. Specifically, participants were asked to focus their attention on a 
cross located between two rectangles presented on a computer screen. Then, a cue word 
that was either neutral or threatening was presented in one of the rectangles for 600 
milliseconds (ms). Next, the cue disappeared and a probe appeared in one of the two 
rectangles. The participant’s task was to identify the location of the probe by clicking the 
side of the computer mouse that matched the location of the probe (e.g., the participant 
would click on the right side of the mouse if the probe were on the right side of the 
screen). In some of the trials the cue and the probe appeared in the same location (valid 
trials), in some of the trials the cue and the probe appeared in opposite locations (invalid 
trials), and in some trials, there was no cue. Previous research suggested that individuals 
with high levels of social anxiety disorder have slower reaction times to invalid trials 
following social threat cues than non-anxious control participants (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 
2005). This pattern of responding has led some researchers to believe that individuals 
with social anxiety have difficulty disengaging their attention from threatening stimuli 
(e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002).  
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Following the baseline assessment of attention to threat, participants completed a 
computerized task that was a variation of the dot probe paradigm (MacLeod et al., 1986). 
During each trial of the task, participants were instructed to focus on the fixation cross 
that appeared in the center of the computer screen for 500 ms. Following the 
disappearance of the cross, two facial images were presented immediately and 
simultaneously. One of the stimuli appeared on the top portion of the screen, while the 
other appeared on the bottom portion of the screen. Stimuli were displayed on the 
computer screen for 500 ms. The images were replaced by either an “E” or an “F” and the 
task of the participants was to indentify the letter via a response on the computer mouse. 
For participants who were randomly assigned to the attention modification program 
condition, the probe always replaced the neutral face during trials in which both a neutral 
and a disgusted face appeared. For participants who were randomly assigned to the 
attention control condition, the probe replaced the neutral and disgusted facial stimuli 
with equal frequency during trials in which both a neutral and a disgusted face were 
simultaneously presented. Following the attention manipulation, the participants again 
completed the task designed to measure their attention to threat, as well as a measure of 
state social anxiety. Participants then delivered an impromptu speech that lasted up to 
five minutes and, finally, completed a measure of state social anxiety. The speeches were 
videotaped and rated for quality by judges who were blind to condition.  
Evidence from this study is consistent with the idea that attention modification 
affects anxiety symptoms. The participants in the attention modification program 
condition exhibited less attention to threat in the second assessment of attention to threat, 
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reported less anxiety concerning the speech, and gave better speeches than the individuals 
in the attention control condition.  
Similarly, Li et al. (2008) reported a greater reduction in some self-reported social 
anxiety symptoms and a reduction in the attentional bias towards threat for individuals 
who completed attention training over the course of seven days, as opposed to individuals 
who completed a control task. All participants reported high levels of social anxiety prior 
to the study. The attention training modified the attention of participants using a version 
of the dot probe paradigm by creating a contingency between the location of the cues and 
the probe. In particular, the probe always appeared in the location formerly occupied by 
the happy face, as opposed to the threatening face, during trials in which both types of 
facial stimuli were presented. There was no contingency between type of facial stimuli 
and the location of the probe in the attention task completed by the control group.  
Finally, Schmidt et al. (2009) reported results similar to Amir et al. (2008) and Li 
et al. (2008) using participants with a social anxiety disorder diagnosis. Furthermore, 
their follow-up reports indicated that the benefits of the attention training were still 
present four months after the attention manipulation. The effectiveness of the treatments 
based on attention modification supports the assertion that individuals with high levels of 
social anxiety exhibit attention to threat patterns that differ from the patterns those 
individuals with low levels of social anxiety exhibit.   
Based on the aforementioned studies, it appears as though treatments for social 
anxiety based on attention modification are efficacious. Evidence for the efficacy of 
attention modification based treatments for social anxiety underscores the need to better 
understand which variables influence attention to threat in social anxiety. This type of 
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knowledge is necessary for the refinement of therapeutic techniques. Toward that end, the 
relative influence of state and trait anxiety on attentional patterns should be better 
understood. As will be discussed below, there is some suggestion that state and trait 
social anxiety differentially influence attention to threat (Rutherford et al., 2004).  
1.4. State versus Trait Anxiety 
Although most studies of attention to threat are primarily interested in patterns of 
attention exhibited by individuals with high and low trait anxiety, state anxiety appears to 
be an important variable with the potential to influence the nature of attentional 
processes. This is consistent with the model of anxiety proposed by Mathews and 
Mackintosh (1998). There are a number of studies that attempt to increase state social 
anxiety to explore patterns of attention to threat. The methods and conclusions of some of 
these studies are presented below, with an emphasis on those studies that manipulate state 
social anxiety to create high and low state anxiety groups.  
One common method of inducing state social anxiety is by informing the 
participant that they will be asked to give a speech. At least six studies of social anxiety 
and attention to threat have examined patterns of attention in the presence and the 
absence of a speech threat. For example, Mansell, Ehlers, Clark, and Chen (2002) 
presented individuals with varying levels of social anxiety with positive and negative 
social-evaluative words in a dot probe task either under conditions of a speech threat or in 
the absence of a speech threat. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross 
for 500 ms. Next, an emotional word was presented simultaneously with a neutral word 
for 500 ms. Following the disappearance of the stimuli, either an “E” or an “F” replaced 
one of the stimuli and the participants’ task was to identify the letter. Bias scores were 
 
 
26
calculated according to MacLeod et al. (1986). Participants in the speech threat condition 
exhibited less avoidance of emotional stimuli than individuals in the no speech condition. 
The high trait social anxiety showed a bias towards attention to negative stimuli. No such 
bias was exhibited by the low trait social anxiety group.  
Similarly, Pineles and Mineka (2005) asked individuals with high and low levels 
of social anxiety in the presence or absence of a social threat to view pairs of facial 
stimuli in a dot probe task.1 At the start of each of the trials, a fixation cross was 
presented for 500 ms. Then, two faces were presented simultaneously for 500 ms. The 
face pairs were either neutral-happy, neutral-threat, or happy-threat. Following the 
disappearance of the facial stimuli, a probe appeared and the task of the participant was to 
indicate the location of the probe via pressing one of two buttons on a response box. 
There was no significant evidence of group differences with respect to attentional biases, 
but there was a trend for a bias towards threat in the high social anxiety and social threat 
condition only.  
Using a somewhat different methodology, Lee and Telch (2008) produced results 
consistent with Pineles and Mineka (2005), as well as Mansell at al. (2002). Researchers 
asked individuals with high and low levels of social anxiety to participate in an attention 
task either in the presence or absence of a social threat. On some trials of the task, 
unexpected stimuli were presented, including happy and frowning facial expressions. 
Participants were probed following the task concerning these stimuli. Under conditions of 
social threat, highly socially anxious individuals were more likely to report seeing 
                                                 
1 Note: Some trials included the presentation of a visual representation of either a sound wave or false 
heart-rate feedback. The conclusions regarding those trials are beyond the scope of the paper and will not 
be discussed 
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frowning faces than happy faces, while the opposite was true for individuals with low 
levels of social anxiety.  
Similarly, Ononaiye, Turpin, and Reidy (2007) found evidence of attention to 
threat under the threat of a speech task. In their study, participants with high and low trait 
social anxiety completed a dot probe task. In addition, half of the participants were 
informed that they would be giving a speech that would be evaluated later by 
professionals. Each of the 96 trials of the dot probe task began with a fixation cross 
presented for 500 ms. Next, a neutral and a threatening word were presented 
simultaneously for 14 ms. A mask (e.g., XXXX) appeared for the subsequent 486 ms. 
Results indicate that highly socially anxious individuals exhibited an attentional bias 
towards masked threat (i.e., words relevant to physical threat) when threatened with a 
speech task. Low socially anxious individuals did not exhibit this bias.  
The results of this study are somewhat puzzling considering evidence that 
attention to threat should be specific to the nature of one’s anxiety (Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992). In other words, 
individuals with high social anxiety should differ from low socially anxiety individuals 
with respect to their attention to stimuli associated with the potential for negative 
evaluation (e.g., facial stimuli, social-evaluative words) only. There is a possibility that 
the exaggerated attention to physical threat words was only apparent because the 
participants were all students obtaining health-related degrees and, therefore, the physical 
threat words were extremely salient to them.   
As an another example of the importance of state social anxiety, Mansell et al. 
(2002) found evidence of a greater bias towards threat for people who were anticipating 
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giving a speech than for people who were not. Individuals with high and low trait anxiety 
were recruited for their study of attention to threat. Prior to the completion of a dot probe 
task, half of the participants were informed that they would have to give a speech that 
would be recorded and evaluated by psychologists. Each participant completed 64 trials 
of a dot probe task. On each trial of the dot probe task, a fixation cross was presented for 
500 ms. Next, a neutral word paired with either a positive or a negative social-evaluative 
word was presented for 500 ms. Then, an “E” or an “F” was presented and the 
participants’ task was to identify the letter as quickly as possible without sacrificing 
accuracy. Bias scores were calculated according to MacLeod et al. (1986). There was no 
evidence of an attentional bias in the high social anxiety group. However, participants 
who were expecting to give a speech exhibited a greater bias towards threat than the 
participants who did not expect to give a speech.  
Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, and Chen (1999) reported contradictory results. They 
asked participants with high and low levels of trait social anxiety to complete the same 
task with the same stimuli as Chen et al. (2002), however, they manipulated state anxiety 
by informing half of the participants that they would have to make a speech that would be 
evaluated by the research assistant as well as a professional. Their results are partially 
consistent with Chen et al. (2002) because they found an attentional bias away from 
emotional faces for the high trait social anxiety group, however, the attentional bias away 
from emotional faces was only present in the speech condition.   
Some studies have reported that individuals with high social anxiety exhibit a 
specific vigilance for threat, while others have reported evidence for vigilance for 
emotional stimuli in general. There is some evidence that trait social anxiety influences 
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attention to threat, whereas state social anxiety influences attention to emotional stimuli 
(e.g., Mansell et al., 2002). Rutherford et al. (2004) provided a direct test of this 
hypothesis.  
Participants in the Rutherford et al. (2004) study engaged in an emotional Stroop 
task. During the emotional Stroop task, participants were presented with emotional 
(positive or negative) or neutral words written in varying colors of ink over 384 trials. 
The participant’s task was to name the ink color. The task works on the assumption that 
word naming, but not color naming, is an automatic process (Chajut & Algom, 2003). 
Emotional Stroop interference occurs when the individual’s response time is greater 
when asked to report an emotional word than when asked to indicate the neutral word, 
presumably due to interference created from the emotional word.  
Participants were grouped into high and low trait anxiety and were tested twice. 
Testing occurred in both a time period far away from an examination and a time period 
close to an examination. Results supported the hypothesis that high trait anxiety 
individuals would show greater Stroop interference when naming negative, as opposed to 
positive words, in comparison to low trait anxiety individuals. Also in support of the 
study’s hypothesis, individuals exhibited a greater Stroop interference for emotional 
words, as compared to control words, when examinations were close. Results suggested 
that trait social anxiety influences attention to threat, whereas state social anxiety 
influences attention to emotional stimuli.  
Some researchers have suggested that both trait and state anxiety contribute to the 
development of patterns of attention to threat. According to Mathews and Mackintosh 
(1998), increases in state anxiety should improve an individual’s ability to detect threat. 
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Consistent with that assertion, an attentional bias towards threat appears to be more 
reliably present in studies in which efforts have been made to increase the state anxiety of 
the participants (e.g., Lee & Telch, 2008), although avoidance of threat under conditions 
of elevated social anxiety have also been reported (Mansell et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that attentional patterns of individuals do 
not predict anxiety levels, unless there is a threat present. For example, in a recent study 
(Klumpp & Amir, 2010), socially anxious participants were randomly assigned to engage 
in one of three attention training tasks to manipulate attention a) towards threat, b) away 
from threat, or c) towards threat and neutral with equal frequency (control). Following 
attention training, anxiety levels did not differ between training groups. However, 
following training, participants completed a speech task. Participants who were trained to 
attend to threat or away from threat reported less anxiety than participants in the control 
condition at post-speech. In other words, attentional patterns predicted anxiety in the 
presence of, but not in the absence of, a threat. Finally, there is evidence that trait social 
anxiety influenced attention to threat, whereas state social anxiety influenced attention to 
emotional stimuli.  
1.5. Negative Affect 
Although anxiety is often believed to cause patterns of attention to threat, it is 
important to determine whether the effects concerning attention to threat are specific to 
anxiety or if they can be caused by another factor related to anxiety. One potential 
alternative explanation for the attention to threat patterns observed in high anxiety 
individuals is that negative affect, and not anxiety per se, causes biased attention to 
threat. Although there is evidence that negative affect influences patterns of attention to 
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emotional stimuli, generally, research supports the notion that anxiety affects attention to 
threat specifically, even after controlling for negative affect.  
Some studies show a relationship between negative affect and attention to 
dysphoric, but not threatening, stimuli. To demonstrate the relationship between negative 
affect and attention to emotional stimuli, Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, and Wells (2008) 
recruited young adults who were either experiencing a major depressive episode, or 
reported no history of a major depressive episode to participate in an eye tracking task. 
The task involved viewing the simultaneous presentation of a dysphoric, a threatening, a 
neutral, and a positive stimulus for 30 seconds. The location of the participant’s gaze was 
tracked continuously using the eye tracking equipment. Depressed participants spent 
more time examining the dysphoric, and less time examining the positive, stimuli than 
the non-depressed participants. There were no differences between the groups regarding 
time spent examining threatening stimuli.  
Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Neubauer Yue, and Joormann (2004) provided evidence 
that depressed individuals exhibit an attentional bias towards dysphoric, but not 
threatening, stimuli. The researchers recruited participants who were diagnosed as having 
major depressive disorder or generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), or who were healthy 
controls. In a variation of the dot probe task, researchers presented participants with a 
fixation cross for 500 ms followed by pairs of faces for 1,000 ms. One face was always 
neutral, while the other face was sad, happy, or angry. Next, a target stimulus appeared 
on either the left or right side of the computer screen (replacing one of the facial stimuli). 
The participants’ task was to indicate via a keyboard response the location of the dot. 
 
 
32
Depressed participants exhibited a bias towards sadness, but no other biases were found 
either within the depressed group or the GAD group.  
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, Mathews, Ridgeway, and Williamson 
(1996) provided evidence that depressed individuals exhibit an attentional bias towards 
threat. Depressed and anxious individuals (with either a generalized anxiety disorder or 
panic disorder with or without agoraphobia) participated in a modified version of the dot 
probe task. During the task, participants were presented simultaneously with two words. 
One of the words was always neutral and the other was always threatening (physically or 
socially). Depressed individuals exhibited a bias towards the socially threatening words, 
whereas anxious individuals only exhibited a bias for physically threatening words. 
Although the results might seem surprising, it is important to note that the study did not 
control for the high co-morbidity between anxious and depressive symptoms (Chartier et 
al., 2003). Therefore, it is difficult to know whether the attention towards threat exhibited 
by the depressed participants was due to depressive symptoms per se, or to concurrent 
anxious symptoms.   
As evidence that attention to threat is associated with anxiety per se, and not 
negative affect, a number of studies have controlled for negative affect either statistically 
or by not allowing individuals with high levels of negative affect to participate in their 
study. For example, Bradley et al. (1998) asked participants with high and low levels of 
trait anxiety to complete a dot probe task with 128 trials. Each trials started with a 
fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the simultaneous presentation of a neutral and 
either a happy or a threatening facial expression for 500 ms or 1250 ms. Next, a probe 
appeared in a location formerly occupied by one of the stimuli and the participants’ task 
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was to indicate which type of probe appeared (i.e., : or ..). Bias scores were calculated by 
finding the difference between the reaction times when the emotional cue and probe were 
in opposite locations and the reaction times when the cue and the probe were in the same 
location. Results revealed that, when the effects of depression are accounted for, the high 
trait anxious group exhibited a bias towards threatening, but not emotional, faces in the 
500 ms condition. In addition, it appeared that people with high levels of depression 
avoided happy faces, whereas individuals with low levels of depression attended to happy 
faces.  
Although there are some inconsistencies in the literature concerning negative 
affect and attention to threat, most research supports the notion that negative affect 
influences attention to dysphoric, but not threatening, stimuli. Evidence for this assertion 
derives from studies using populations that differ with regards to anxiety and depressive 
symptoms, as well as from studies that control statistically for negative affect.  
1.6. Facilitated Detection or Difficulty with Disengagement? 
 There has been debate concerning whether the patterns of attention to threat 
associated with social anxiety are attributable to facilitated detection of threat or with 
difficulty disengaging from that threat. Some theoretical conceptualizations of the 
association between anxiety and attention to threat suggest that anxiety should facilitate 
attention to threat, but the empirical evidence is mixed with regard to this question. 
Relevant studies are presented below.  
All of the previously reviewed models of attention and anxiety suggest that 
anxiety should facilitate the detection of threat. Evidence from visual search tasks in 
which participants must find a target stimulus among non-target stimuli provide evidence 
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that there is a facilitated detection of threat associated with anxiety. If a participant is 
quicker to find a threatening target than a non-threatening target, then facilitated attention 
to threat is assumed. For example, Juth et al. (2005) found that participants were the most 
effective at detecting threatening facial stimuli among other facial stimuli if they were 
high in social anxiety and under conditions of social threat. As another example, Veljaca 
and Rapee (1998) conducted a study in which they asked participants to give a speech in 
front of an audience and to indicate via a response button when they noticed an audience 
member engaging in negative (e.g., yawning) or positive (e.g., leaning forward) social 
behaviors. They found that highly socially anxious individuals detected more negative 
and less positive social behaviors. Despite the evidence for an association between threat 
detection abilities and anxiety, a number of researchers using visual search tasks have 
reported that facilitated detection of threat is not specific to individuals with high levels 
of anxiety (e.g., Esteves, 1999). 
Evidence from emotional cuing tasks suggests that individuals with high trait 
social anxiety have difficulty disengaging from threatening stimuli. Typically, in an 
emotional cueing task, which is a variation of the Posner paradigm (Posner, 1980), an 
emotional (e.g., a social threat word) or a neutral cue (e.g., a neutral word) appears. Then, 
the cue disappears and a probe that the participant must identify appears either in the 
same area as (valid) or in a different area than (invalid) the cue. Responses to invalid 
trials require attentional disengagement followed by a subsequent attentional shift, 
whereas valid trials do not. Many studies have found that, when presented with an invalid 
probe following a threatening stimulus, participants with high levels of anxiety were 
slower to respond to the probe than controls (Amir, et al., 2003) and that this slowing was 
 
 
35
not present on valid trials during which threatening stimuli were presented (Fox et al., 
2002). This information suggests that the anxious individual experiences difficulty 
shifting their attention away from the threatening stimulus.  
In an eye tracking task, Buckner, Maner, and Schmidt (2010) concluded that 
individuals with high social anxiety have difficulty disengaging their visual attention 
from negative, but not positive, facial expressions. A non-clinical sample of participants 
with varying levels of trait social anxiety (oversampled for high levels of trait social 
anxiety) participated in an eye tracking task. Each trial of the task had a duration of 2,000 
ms and contained four stimuli. On critical trials, one of the stimuli was a happy or 
disgusted facial photograph along with three non-social stimuli matched for valence, 
threat, and arousal. Filler trials contained four non-social stimuli. Eye movements were 
tracked throughout the trials. Participants with high trait social anxiety were slower than 
low trait social anxiety participants to disengage from negative facial stimuli, but not 
positive facial expressions.  
 There is evidence that both facilitated detection to threat and difficulty with 
disengagement might be involved in the creation of attention to threat patterns associated 
with social anxiety. It is possible that both processes are important, but that one process is 
more salient than the other, depending on the nature of the task.  
1.7. Methodological Considerations  
As can be seen in the empirical findings section of the current literature review, 
the exact nature of the patterns of attention to threat exhibited by individuals with high 
levels of anxiety is unclear. Gaps in the extant literature on anxiety and attention to threat 
might be partially the result of deficiencies in commonly used methods to study attention 
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to threat. A variety of methodologies have been used to assess attention to threat, 
however, the majority of studies have used indirect measures of attention such as the 
emotional Stroop task, or a variation of the dot-probe task (Bögels & Mansell, 2004). 
Both of these methods rely on reaction times to make inferences about attention. 
Undoubtedly, the use of more direct measures of oculomotor behavior will improve our 
knowledge of attention to threat.  
During the emotional Stroop task, participants are presented with emotional or 
neutral words written in varying colors of ink. The participants’ task typically is to name 
the ink color. The task operates on the assumption that word naming, but not color 
naming, is an automatic process (Chajut & Algom, 2003). Emotional Stroop interference 
occurs when the individual’s response time is greater when asked to report an emotional 
word than when asked to indicate the neutral word. Although the emotional Stroop task 
has increased our knowledge of attention to threat in social anxiety (e.g., Amir, 
Freshman, & Foa, 2002), it is unclear whether the emotional Stroop effect is assessing 
attention to threat, or other processes, such as cognitive avoidance (Bögels & Mansell, 
2004). Therefore, conclusions drawn from studies using an emotional Stroop task should 
be questioned with these limitations in mind.  
MacLeod et al. (1986) developed the dot probe task as a measure of attention to 
threat. There are many variations of this task, but, in general, participants are asked to 
focus their attention in the center of a computer screen until two stimuli appear (typically 
one is threatening and the other is neutral). Next, the stimuli disappear and a probe 
appears in place of one of the stimuli. Typically, the participant indicates either on which 
side of the screen the probe is or to identify the probe in some way (e.g., is it an “E” or an 
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“F?”). Theoretically, individuals should be quicker to respond to probes replacing the 
pictures to which they were attending than probes replacing the non-attended stimuli. 
Therefore, reaction times are used as indicators of location of attention. Undoubtedly, the 
dot probe task has been useful for the study of attention to threat in social anxiety (e.g., 
Amir et al., 2003), however, the dot probe task is an indirect measure of attention and 
does not allow the researcher to assess the location of attention moment to moment.  
As a result of the indirect nature of the emotional Stroop task and the dot probe 
task, as well as the necessity for these assessments to occur in a laboratory setting, 
external and ecological validity are limited by the use of these methods. Eye tracking 
technology can circumvent these limitations in at least two ways. First, eye tracking 
allows for a more direct assessment of visual attention patterns as it allows researchers to 
determine the focus of visual attention from moment to moment. Second, ambulatory eye 
tracking allows the researcher to monitor attentional patterns of participants in “real-
world” settings. Therefore, the information gained from eye tracking methods would be 
an important addition to the knowledge of the vigilance-avoidance pattern of attention 
associated with social anxiety because of the improvement in both external and 
ecological validity.   
Currently, there are only a handful of published studies that utilize eye tracking 
technology in the study of visual attention to threat and anxiety (e.g., Armstrong, 
Olatunji, Sarawgi, & Simmons, 2010; Buckner et al., 2010; Kimble, Fleming, Bandy, 
Kim, & Zambetti, 2010; Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007; Rinck & Becker, 2006; 
Rohner, 2002). A recent study highlighted an advantage of eye tracker technology not 
previously mentioned. Wieser, Pauli, Alpers, and Muhlberger (2009) monitored the eye 
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movements of women with high, medium, and low levels of social anxiety in response to 
an animated video of faces providing either direct or averted gazes. Results suggested 
that women with high levels of social anxiety fixate longer on the eye region of other 
individuals than women with low or medium levels of anxiety. Eye tracker technology 
allows for researchers to assess attention to pre-determined points of interest, such as 
particular areas of the facial stimuli, as opposed to less specific areas.  
Eye tracking has the potential to greatly improve research in the area as it 
provides the opportunity to assess directly the location of visual attention and its time 
course. Indirect measures of attention (e.g., the dot-probe task or the Stroop task) have 
been useful for answering questions concerning attention to threat. However, due to the 
indirect nature of these assessments, construct validity is limited. Eye tracking allows for 
a more direct assessment of oculomotor behavior (i.e., eye movements including 
avoidance) as it permits the determination of the focus of visual attention from moment to 
moment.  
CHAPTER 2: PURPOSE OF DISSERTATION STUDY 
 Social anxiety causes significant impairment (Katzelnick et al., 2001; Schneier et 
al., 1994) for a large number of individuals (Kessler et al., 2005). There is some evidence 
that treatments based on the modification of attention to threat can reduce symptoms of 
social anxiety (e.g., Amir et al., 2008), however, the efficacy of those treatments would 
likely be improved if some of the inconsistencies in the literature were resolved. There 
are a number of inconsistencies. For example, the nature of the attentional patterns 
associated with social anxiety in the presence of threat is not clear. In other words, some 
studies presented evidence of vigilance (Chen et al., 2002); whereas others reported 
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evidence of avoidance of emotional stimuli (Mansell et al., 1999) and others reported the 
absence of any patterns associated with anxiety (Esteves, 1999). Also, there is some 
evidence that trait social anxiety influences attention to threat, whereas state social 
anxiety influences attention to emotional stimuli more generally (e.g., Mansell et al., 
2002; Rutherford et al., 2004), but there are not many studies that directly test this 
hypothesis. Also, research should be conducted to clarify the differential effects of state 
and trait anxiety on patterns of attention to threat and emotional stimuli. Similarly, more 
research should be conducted to clarify the unique influences of negative affect and 
anxiety on patterns of attention to threat. Finally, the cognitive processes responsible for 
the observed attention patterns are unclear, partially because commonly used methods of 
assessing attention indirectly assess attention and confound other attentional processes 
with attention. It is possible that anxiety facilitates attention to threat, or it is possible that 
it impedes attentional disengagement. The purpose of the current study was to address 
some of the limitations of the attention to threat literature using a method that allows for 
the direct assessment of attention.  
CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
Consistent with both conceptual models of anxiety (e.g., Barlow, 2000; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998), as well as a number of empirical investigations (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, 
et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005), it was hypothesized that the current empirical 
investigation would find evidence of biased processing of threat in individuals with 
elevated levels of social anxiety. The specific hypotheses are presented below. 
 
 
 
 
40
3.1. Testing the Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis 
3.1a. Fixation Time 
In light of the evidence supporting the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (e.g., 
Vassilopoulos, 2005) and the theoretical importance of anxiety for the facilitated 
detection of threat (e.g., Barlow, 2000), it was hypothesized that individuals in the high 
trait social anxiety group would fixate more quickly on threatening stimuli than 
individuals in the low trait social anxiety group, after controlling for the effects of 
negative affect, and regardless of the presence or absence of a social-evaluative threat.  
3.1b. Run Count 
It was hypothesized that individuals in the high trait social anxiety group would 
return their attention more frequently to threatening stimuli than individuals in the low 
trait social anxiety group when first presented with threat, but that they would 
subsequently return their attention less frequently after controlling for the effects of 
negative affect and regardless of the presence or absence of a social-evaluative threat.  
1c. First Run Dwell Time 
It was hypothesized that individuals in the high trait social anxiety group would 
spend more time examining threatening stimuli when initially presented with threatening 
stimuli than individuals in the low trait social anxiety group, but that they would 
subsequently spend less time examining the threatening stimuli, after controlling for the 
effects of negative affect and regardless of the presence or absence of a social-evaluative 
threat.  
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3.2. State Anxiety and Emotional Stimuli 
 There is some evidence that trait social anxiety influences attention to threat, 
whereas state social anxiety influences attention to emotional stimuli (e.g., Rutherford et 
al., 2004). Multiple studies have documented the existence of an attentional bias towards 
emotional stimuli for individuals with high levels of state anxiety when they are first 
presented with the stimuli (e.g., Mansell et al., 2002). Therefore, it was hypothesized that 
individuals in the high state anxiety group would fixate more quickly than individuals in 
the low state anxiety group on emotional stimuli (i.e., threatening or happy), after 
controlling for the effects of negative affect and regardless of their trait social anxiety.   
3.3. Difficulty with Disengagement 
Research indicates that the observed attentional biases towards threat observed on 
dot probe tasks for individuals with high levels of trait social anxiety might be a result of 
difficulty disengaging attention from threatening stimuli (e.g., Fox et al., 2002). It was 
hypothesized that individuals with high trait social anxiety would spend more time 
attending to threatening stimuli following their first fixation on the threatening stimuli 
before viewing the other stimuli than individuals in the low trait social anxiety group, 
after controlling for negative affect and regardless of the presence or absence of social-
evaluative threat.   
CHAPTER 4: METHOD 
4.1 Participants 
Eight hundred and thirty-five participants were recruited from the University of 
Nebraska’s (UNL) undergraduate psychology pool to participate in a mass testing that 
included the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation (BFNE; described in the Measures 
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section). The UNL undergraduate psychology pool primarily consisted of students in the 
Introduction to Psychology classes, although other undergraduate psychology classes 
were represented as well.  
Participants completed the BFNE in either the spring (n = 764) or summer (n = 
71) semester. Approximately half of the participants in the spring (49.48%) and 66.70% 
of the participants in the summer were women. Table 4.1 includes descriptive statistics 
for the BFNE completed during mass testing for each gender by semester.  
Participants with high and low social anxiety, as measured by the BFNE, were 
recruited for participation in the second phase of the study. High social anxiety men and 
women scored at or above 42 and 45, respectively, whereas low social anxiety men and 
women scored at or below 31 and 34, respectively. The cut-off scores were determined 
by the highest and lowest quartiles of scores in the spring mass testing for each gender. In 
cases in which the gender of the mass testing participant was unknown, the participant 
was invited to participate in the second phase of the study given that their score on the 
BFNE met criteria for inclusion in the second phase of the study, regardless of gender.  
The decision to use a non-clinical sample was made for pragmatic reasons. The use of a 
non-clinical sample does not appear to be problematic as non-clinical samples have been 
used in the past to study attention to threat (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998), facilitating the 
comparison between the results of the proposed studies and prior studies.  
In addition, preliminary data analysis of a recent study of attention to threat at 
UNL suggests that the variability in social anxiety in our undergraduate samples is 
sufficient and predicts attention to threat. Furthermore, the Rapee and Heimberg (1997) 
model suggests that the experience of transient anxiety and social anxiety disorder differ  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the mass testing BFNE scores for each gender by 
semester 
            
Semester Gender M SD Range N 
      
Spring Men 36.66 9.15 16-60 364 
      
 Women 38.76 8.99 16-60 378 
      
 Unknown Gender 37.14 8.48 24-51 22 
      
 Total 37.72 9.10 16-60 764 
      
Summer Men 37.17 8.18 21-53 23 
      
 Women 32.54 8.90 15-52 48 
      
 Unknown Gender NA NA NA 0 
      
 Total 34.04 8.89 15-53 71 
      
Combined Men 36.69 9.09 16-60 387 
      
 Women 38.06 9.19 15-60 426 
      
 Unknown Gender 37.14 8.48 24-51 22 
      
 Total 37.4 9.14 15-60 835 
            
Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation 
quantitatively, not qualitatively, making it possible that the results of the proposed 
research would be relevant for individuals who suffer from social anxiety disorder. 
Finally, meta-analytic evidence suggests that the effect size associated with threat-related 
attentional biases does not differ significantly between participants diagnosed with an 
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anxiety disorder and high anxiety, non-clinical participants (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007).  
Ninety-one individuals participated in the second phase of the study. 
Approximately half of the participants in the second phase of the study were women 
(52.70%). The majority of participants (84.62%) identified as “White,” seven participants 
(7.69%) identified as “Hispanic,” one participant (1.10%) identified as “Asian,” one 
participant (1.10%) identified as “African-American,” and five participants (5.49%) 
identified themselves as “Other.” The average age of participants was 20.40 (SD = 3.27). 
Table 4.2 provides univariate statistics for the mass testing BFNE scores of the 
participants by anxiety group and gender.  
4.2. Measures 
4.2a. The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) served as the 
primary measure of trait social anxiety. The BFNE is a 12-item measure of the extent to 
which the participant worries that others have an unfavorable view of the participant. 
Respondents are asked to rate how characteristic of them each item is on a scale ranging 
from 1 (Not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (Extremely characteristic of me).  
The scale demonstrates good internal consistency and is correlated in expected 
ways with measures of loneliness and depression (Duke, Krishnan, Faith, & Storch, 
2006), though some analyses suggest that the reversed scored items are not as related to 
theoretically similar constructs as the non-reversed scored items (Rodebaugh et al., 2004; 
Weeks et al., 2005). Internal consistency was high in the current study (coefficient α = 
.95).  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for the mass testing BFNE scores for each anxiety group 
in phase two by gender 
            
Social Anxiety Gender BFNE 
    M SD Range N 
      
High Men 49.05 5.06 43-60 20 
      
 Women 51.30 4.82 45-60 20 
      
 Total 50.18 5.01 43-60 40 
      
Low Men 23.87 3.82 17-31 23 
      
 Women 27.46 3.49 20-33 28 
      
 Total 25.84 4.03 17-33 51 
      
Total Men 35.58 13.44 17-60 43 
      
 Women 37.40 12.55 20-60 48 
      
 Total 36.54 12.94 17-60 91 
            
Note: BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation    
 
Although not explicitly designed as a measure of social anxiety, per se, the BFNE 
was chosen as the trait social anxiety for the current studies for two reasons. First, fear of 
negative evaluation appears to be a core feature of social anxiety. Second, the BFNE does 
not tap into fear of specific social situations, which is important given that the task in 
Study 1 has no social context. In a psychometric assessment of the BFNE when used with 
a clinical population, Collins, Westra, Dozois, and Stewart (2005) reported evidence of 
the measure’s construct, convergent, and discriminant validity. Specifically, they 
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indicated that the measure could differentiate between individuals diagnosed with social 
phobia and panic disorder and that changes in social anxiety symptoms tended to parallel 
changes in the individual’s score on the measure. Furthermore, they reported that the 
measure correlated with measures of social avoidance and depression, but not with 
agoraphobic avoidance and demographic variables, in a sample of individuals with either 
social phobia or panic disorder. Finally, results of their study suggested that the measure 
has good inter-item reliability as well as two week test-retest reliability.  
4.2b. Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker   
The Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966) is a 
commonly used measure of public speaking anxiety. The measure consists of 30 items 
pertaining to thoughts, feelings, and perceptions before, during, and after a speech. 
Respondents indicate whether each item is “true” or “false” and higher scores reflect 
greater anxiety. Although the scale was published over 40 years ago, more recently 
published normative data are available (Phillips, Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1997). In 
addition, there is evidence that the scale is internally consistent (Klorman, Weerts, 
Hastings, Melamed, & Lang, 1974) and valid (Lombardo, 1988). Internal consistency 
was high in the current study (coefficient α = .93).  
4.2c. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) is a commonly used measure of affect that consists of a 10-question scale that 
measures positive affect (PA) and another 10-question scale that measures negative affect 
(NA). Each item consists of an adjective and the participant must rate how much they 
typically feel this way, on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The 
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scales of the PANAS have demonstrated good internal consistency and appropriate 
correlations with measures of anxiety and depression (Crawford & Henry, 2004). The 
current study used the PANAS-NA only as a measure of negative affect. Internal 
consistency was high in the current study (coefficient α = .86).  
4.2d. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1970) is a self-report measure of anxiety symptoms. It contains two scales: the trait scale 
and the state scale. The trait scale was not used in the proposed study. The state scale 
measures the current intensity of anxiety symptoms. It contains 20 statements describing 
anxious or non-anxious feelings such as, “I am tense.” Examinees rate on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 4 the degree to which they agree with the statement at the moment, with 1 
being “not at all” and 4 being “very much so.”  
Barnes, Harp, and Jung (2002) examined the reported internal consistency 
reliability coefficients for over 50 research articles that used the STAI. They determined 
that, on average, the state anxiety scale had an internal consistency reliability coefficient 
of .91. Internal consistency was high in the current study (coefficient α = .92 and .96 for 
the first and second administrations, respectively). Also, using seven research articles that 
reported test-retest reliabilities for the trait and state anxiety scales, Barnes et al. (2002) 
determined that the average test-retest reliability of the state scale is .70. In addition, 
Metzger (1976) reported evidence of the validity of the scales, as well as appropriate test-
retest reliabilities for both the state (.45) and trait (.97) when there were 21 days between 
tests. Similarly, Rule and Traver (1983) reported a two-week test-retest reliability 
coefficient of .40 for the state scale. Also, Rule and Traver (1983) provided evidence of 
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the validity of the state scale that is relevant in the current study. They reported that the 
state scores increased significantly from baseline when the participants were presented 
with a social anxiety provoking situation.   
4.3. Equipment 
 The SR Research EyeLink II, a second-generation, video based eye tracking 
system that allows researchers to assess visual attention from moment to moment, was 
utilized in the proposed studies. The system includes three small cameras that are 
mounted on a headband that the participant wears. One camera is directed at each eye and 
the third collects information about the environment. Essentially, after an initial 
calibration, the system can determine the location of an individual’s gaze either on a 
computer screen, or outside of the laboratory (through the utilization of one of the head-
mounted cameras).  
The system collects eye movement data at a sampling rate of 500 Hz (500 
samples per second) with a 3 ms lag time and has an average gaze position error of less 
than 0.5°. The system is light weight, has a relatively easy set-up, and can be used when 
participants wear most eye glasses and contacts. The system has the capability to track 
both the left and right eye. It should be noted that the EyeLink II occasionally is unable to 
track both eyes, in which case one eye is chosen for tracking. Consistent with prior 
research in our lab, the EyeLink II was unable to track the eye movements in a small 
percentage of the participants in the current study (i.e., less that 10%).  
The EyeLink II provided information on a variety of variables, including the 
frequency and duration of fixations in predetermined locations, and eye movement 
kinematics (e.g., how quickly a given eye movement occurred). For the purposes of this 
 
 
49
study, a fixation occurs when the eye is relatively stationary (i.e., is moving less than 30º 
per second) for at least 100 ms. 
Eye tracking has an advantage over many other measures of attention, such as dot 
probe tasks, as it can more directly assess the pattern of oculomotor behavior in the 
presence of threat, including avoidance behavior. In addition, the portability of video 
based eye tracking systems allows researchers to collect data about attentional processes 
outside of the laboratory environment. Finally, the EyeLink II can ensure that the 
participant’s gaze is directly centered between the stimuli prior to each trial so as to 
decrease the likelihood that either of the stimuli is more likely to be viewed on each trial.  
4.4. Stimuli 
The facial stimuli came from the NimStim face stimulus set. The NimStim 
stimulus set was provided by the Research Network on Early Experience and Brain 
Development. The stimulus set contains facial stimuli from men and women from a 
variety of ethnic backgrounds displaying expressions of fear, happiness, sadness, anger, 
surprise, calm, neutrality, and disgust that were derived by asking drama students to 
express the aforementioned emotions and photographing the results. Research results 
indicated that, in general, untrained individuals can reliably identify the intended 
emotions in the stimulus set and that there is high agreement among participants 
concerning the identification of the emotional expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). Each 
trial of the experimental task involved the presentation of two facial stimuli. Each trial 
contained one of the following pairs: neutral-angry, neutral-happy, or angry-happy.  
Many studies of attention to threat simultaneously present a threatening and a 
neutral stimulus (e.g., Fox, 1996), however, in order to determine the specificity of the 
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information processing bias, a number of researchers have included trials that contain 
threatening, neutral, happy, or sad stimuli (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998, 1997; Buckner et al., 
2010; Georgiou et al.  2005). It appears as though trait social anxiety predicts attention to 
threat, whereas state social anxiety predicts attention to emotions (Rutherford et al., 
2004). Given the evidence that even non-threatening emotional stimuli differentially 
affect attentional patterns of high and low anxious individuals, the current study included 
neutral-angry, neutral-happy, and angry-happy stimuli pairs. This procedure helped to 
distinguish between the effects of emotional valence and threat per se on attentional 
patterns.  
4.5. Procedure 
 Participants were recruited based on their scores on the BFNE administered 
during a mass testing session. Specifically, the BFNE scores of all mass testing 
participants were calculated and participants whose scores fell in the highest and lowest 
quartiles of their gender were invited to participate via an email.   
4.5a. Informed Consent  
 Prior to engaging in the procedures of the proposed study, participants were 
provided with an informed consent form to read. Participants were instructed not to sign 
the form until the researcher or the research assistant reviewed the procedures with them, 
and any questions they had were addressed. Then, they were asked to sign the form if 
they wished to participate. Participants were assured that their participation would remain 
confidential, and that they were free to withdraw their participation at any point without 
penalty. In addition, participants were informed that there was a possibility that they 
would be asked to deliver a speech. The signing of the informed consent form occurred in 
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a room with a podium facing a set of chairs and a video camera with the intention of 
increasing the likelihood that the participants believed that they would have to deliver a 
speech if assigned to the speech condition.  
4.5b. Data Collection Procedures  
Participants were scheduled up to two at a time. Following the informed consent 
procedures, participants completed the state version of the STAI.  
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either the speech or the no speech 
condition using a block randomization procedure. Specifically, for each pair of 
participants (A and B), a coin flip determined the condition assignment of Participant A 
and Participant B was assigned to the other condition.    
Participants assigned to the speech condition and were told the following: 
You have been assigned to the speech condition. Following a computer 
task, we will assess “your social skills and public speaking ability. In a 
while I am going to ask you to make a speech on a controversial topic. 
This video camera is going to record you so that later some expert 
psychologists can make ratings of your ability. Now, I won’t be giving you 
the topic of the speech until thirty seconds before I start the camera and 
you begin the speech.”(Mansell et al., 1999, p. 678). 
Participants assigned to the no speech condition were told the following: 
You have been assigned to the no speech condition. However, following a 
computer task, we will ask you to watch a video of another individual 
delivering a speech. You will be asked to provide a number of ratings 
concerning the quality of their speech.    
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Next, half of the participants completed the questionnaire packet (including the 
BFNE and the PANAS), followed by the eye tracking task, whereas the other half of the 
participants completed the procedures in the opposite order. The procedure was meant to 
minimize carry-over effects. More importantly, this procedure was designed to exclude 
priming effects as a potential explanation for attention patterns. Participation required 
approximately one hour’s worth of time on behalf of the participant. 
4.5c. The Eye Tracking Task  
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen and the eye tracking 
equipment was fitted. Then, for calibration and validation purposes, the participant was 
asked to visually track a dot that appeared on the computer screen. The participants were 
asked to track the stimuli on the screen until the computer accurately determined the 
location of the individual’s gaze. Next, participants were provided with the following 
verbal instructions: 
In this study, you will be presented with pictures of faces so that we can 
study the way that individuals look at faces. There are no rules concerning 
where you look, so do not feel obligated to examine all parts of the 
pictures. However, you are welcome to do so if you want. All we ask is 
that you look at the screen. Remember, there are no particular areas of 
the screen to which you need to attend. This study contains over 30 trials. 
To start each trial you will have to look directly at the fixation point in the 
middle of the screen while pressing the spacebar. Once the trial finishes 
the fixation point will appear again and you will again look at that point 
and press the spacebar, and so on. Because of this requirement, it might 
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take a few tries before the trial starts sometimes. Please try to not move 
your head or body during this study.  
The participants were presented with 36 trials of the experimental task presented 
in random order. Each trial had a three-second duration and involved the simultaneous 
presentation of two facial stimuli (neutral-angry, neutral-happy, and happy-angry). Each 
type of stimulus (i.e., neutral, angry, and happy) appeared on the right side of the screen 
during half of the trials and on the left side of the screen on the other half of the trials. 
Each pairing appeared with equal frequency. Direction of gaze was monitored 
continuously.   
After the completion of the eye tracking task, participants were reminded of 
whether they were in the speech or the no speech condition and again completed the state 
version of the STAI. Participants in the no speech condition were asked to watch a video 
of another individual delivering a speech and to answer questions regarding their feelings 
about the speech. Participants in the speech condition were asked to give a three-minute 
speech on a controversial topic (i.e., the death penalty or abortion) and provide a number 
of ratings concerning their feelings about the speech and the audience members.  
Participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and given the 
opportunity to ask questions regarding the task.  
4.6. Design Overview 
Trait social anxiety, speech condition, and gender served as between subject 
independent variables. Facial stimulus type (neutral-angry, neutral-happy, or angry-
happy) served as a within subject independent variable. Negative affect served as a 
between subject covariate.  
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4.7. A Priori Power Analyses  
Prior to conducting the current study, analyses were conducted to determine the 
sample size needed to have at least an 80% chance of finding the proposed effects, if they 
existed. Based on prior studies of social anxiety and attention to emotional faces (i.e., 
Mogg et al., 2007; Vassilopoulos, 2005), the vigilance-avoidance pattern is associated 
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = .60, r = .30). In order to find differences between 
the high and low social anxiety groups with respect to gaze bias, assuming a Cohen’s d of 
.60, power tables recommended a sample size of 82, resulting in 41 people per anxiety 
group. There were no good studies to look to for recommendations concerning sample 
size given how infrequent eye tracking had been used to study attention to threat in 
anxiety. Most studies on anxiety and attention to threat use about 20 participants per 
condition, which is less than the sample size that was suggested by the aforementioned 
power analysis. Initially, the study hoped to include ninety participants because data from 
the author’s lab suggested that the eye tracker is unable to collect data from less than 10% 
of participants. Post-hoc power analyses are presented throughout the following section.  
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1. Preliminary Data Procedures  
Following the initial entry, data that were manually entered into SPSS were 
checked for accuracy by research assistants by comparing the entered data to the original 
data recorded by the research participants.  
Consistent with prior research in our lab, the EyeLink II was unable to track the 
eye movements in a small percentage of the participants in the current study. Specifically, 
five participants (5.49%) were not calibrated on the EyeLink II in the current study. 
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Therefore, their data was not included in the tests of the primary hypotheses involving 
eye tracking variables. Four of those participants were in the low trait social anxiety 
group and three were women.      
5.2. Significance Testing 
Consistent with current research guidelines (Wilkinson & Task Force, 1999), 
significance tests (p) and effect sizes (d) with 95% confidence intervals were calculated 
for each of the following analyses.  
5.3. State anxiety manipulation check 
In order to test whether the state STAI scores of the individuals in the speech 
condition increased significantly more from the 1st STAI administration to the 2nd 
administration than the scores of the individuals in the no speech condition, a 2 (speech 
vs. no speech) X 2 (1st vs. 2nd STAI administration) mixed factor ANOVA was 
conducted. Table 5.1 contains the means for the STAI both pre and post speech condition 
assignment.  
There was a main effect of speech condition, F(1, 83) = 11.07, p = .001, such that 
participants in the speech condition had higher STAI scores than participants in the no 
speech condition, regardless of time of administration. There was a significant main 
effect of time of administration, F(1, 83) = 24.71, p < .001, such that STAI scores at the 
2nd administration were higher than those at the first administration, regardless of speech 
condition. In addition, there was a significant interaction between time and speech 
condition, F(1, 83) = 44.38, p < .001. HSD follow-up analyses of the cell means (LSD 
minimum mean difference = 3.86) indicated that there was not a significant difference  
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Table 5.1: Means (standard deviations) for the state form of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) pre and post speech condition assignment by social anxiety group and 
speech condition 
          
Social Anxiety 
Group Speech Condition STAI-1 STAI-2 Combined 
     
High Speech 37.56 (10.73) 53.68 (9.26) 46.14 (7.48) 
     
 No Speech 35.37 (9.23) 33.42 (10.39) 34.33 (9.52) 
     
 Combined 36.43 (9.91) 43.55 (14.13) 40.24 (10.35) 
     
Low Speech 27.83 (7.83) 35.96 (11.93) 31.90 (9.02) 
     
 No Speech 30.04 (7.52) 28.04 (6.20) 28.82 (5.62) 
     
 Combined 28.98 (7.67) 31.84 (10.12) 30.33 (7.56) 
     
Combined Speech 32.00 (10.29) 43.79 (13.93) 38.00 (12.16) 
     
 No Speech 32.29 (8.60) 30.31 (8.56) 31.13 (8.72)  
     
  Combined 32.15 (9.40) 36.90 (13.29) 34.52 (10.08) 
 
between the STAI scores obtained during the 1st and 2nd administrations of the STAI for 
the participants in the no speech condition. As hypothesized, there was a significant 
difference between the STAI scores obtained during the 1st and 2nd administrations of the 
STAI for the participants in the speech condition, such that STAI scores were greater 
during the second administration. Figure 5.1 depicts this interaction. 
5.4. Random Assignment Checks 
Independent samples t-tests comparing PRCS and BFNE scores obtained during 
phase two of the study between the speech and no speech groups were conducted to  
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Figure 5.1: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) scores by speech condition and 
administration. 
examine the effectiveness of random assignment. Table 5.2 contains the group means and 
standard deviations for the PRCS and the BFNE by speech condition and trait social 
anxiety group. 
Unexpectedly, results indicated that participants in the no speech condition had 
lower PRCS scores than individuals in the speech condition, t(89) = -2.18, p = .03. 
Participants were aware of their speech condition assignments prior to the completion of 
the PRCS. Therefore, it is possible that individuals in the speech condition felt less 
confident about their public speaking abilities because of the threat of the impending 
speech. A t-test comparing mass testing BFNE scores between the speech and no speech 
groups was conducted to examine the effectiveness of random assignment. As expected, 
results indicated that there was no difference between BFNE scores for participants in the 
no speech condition and participants in the speech condition, t (89) = 0.08, p = .78 
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Table 5.2: Means (standard deviations) for the Personal Report of Confidence as a 
Speaker (PRCS) and Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation (BFNE) collected in phase two of 
the study by trait social anxiety condition and speech condition 
        
Social Anxiety 
Group 
Speech 
Condition PRCS BFNE 
    
High Speech 22.55 (5.94) 48.79 (4.55) 
    
 No Speech 16.60 (7.98) 46.00 (7.00) 
    
 Combined 19.58 (7.57) 47.36 (6.02) 
    
Low Speech 11.58 (6.41) 26.83 (6.68) 
    
 No Speech 10.19 (5.49) 26.41 (6.02) 
    
 Combined 10.86 (5.93) 26.61 (6.28) 
    
Combined Speech 16.57 (8.25) 36.53 (12.45) 
    
 No Speech 12.98 (7.35) 34.74 (11.69) 
    
  Combined 14.73 (7.97) 35.60 (12.02) 
Note. BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; PRCS = Personal  
     Report of Confidence as a Speaker   
 
5.5. Trait Anxiety Check 
 Participants’ scores on the BFNE completed during the experiment were 
calculated and compared to mass testing BFNE scores. If a participant’s score were to 
deviate more than one standard deviation (9.14; based on mass testing data) from the 
original cut-off score for their pre-determined trait social anxiety group, then the 
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participant would have been excluded from further analysis. No participants were 
excluded based on this criterion.  
5.6. Dependent Variables 
Analyses focused on four critical variables in the current study:  
1) First Fixation Time: First fixation is defined as the amount of time that elapses 
following the start of each trial until the first fixation on each type of stimulus.  
2) Run Count: Run count is defined as the number of times the participants 
returned their attention to each type of stimulus. Run count was calculated for 
the first 1000 ms of each trial, the last 2000 ms of the trial, and for each trial as 
a whole. 
3) Dwell Time: Dwell time is defined as the amount of time participants spent 
attending to each type of stimulus. Dwell time was calculated for the first 1000 
ms of each trial, the last 2000 ms of the trial, and for each trial as a whole.  
4) First Run Dwell Time: First run dwell time is defined as the amount of dwell 
time spent on each type of stimulus the first time they direct their gaze towards 
it during each trial. 
5.7. Gender-Related Analyses 
 It is important to include an analysis of gender-related effects in studies of anxiety 
as there is evidence that there are anxiety-related differences between men and women. 
For example, more women meet diagnostic criteria for social anxiety disorder than men 
(Weinstock, 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence that the timing of the processing of 
emotional information (a very important variable in the current study) differs between 
men and women (Sass, Heller, Stewart, Silton, Edgar, Fisher et al., 2010). Therefore, 
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prior to conducting the analyses presented below, a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) test was conducted to determine whether there were important effects of 
gender that need to be considered. There were no hypotheses regarding gender effects.  
A 2 X 2 X 2 X 6 MANOVA was conducted. Gender, trait social anxiety (high or 
low), and speech condition (speech or no speech) served as between subject independent 
variables. Facial stimulus type (neutral paired with angry; neutral paired with happy; 
angry paired with neutral; angry paired with happy; happy paired with neutral; or happy 
paired with angry) served as a within subject independent variable. Each dependent 
variable involved in the hypotheses was included in the MANOVA: first fixation time, 
run count, dwell time, and first run dwell time. Table 5.3 contains the univariate statistics 
for each dependent variable by gender and facial stimulus type.  
The MANOVA did not result in any significant effects involving gender. The 
main effects of gender, F(24, 54) = 1.40, p = .15, speech condition, F(24, 54) = 1.44, p = 
.14, and trait social anxiety group, F(24, 54) = 1.08, p = .39, were not significant. There 
was not an interaction between gender and speech condition, F(24, 54) = .89, p = .61, or 
between gender and trait social anxiety group, F(24, 54) = 1.22, p = .27, or between 
speech condition and trait social anxiety group, F(24, 54) = 1.46, p = .13. Finally, the 
interaction between gender, speech condition, and trait social anxiety group was not 
significant, F(24, 54) = 1.61, p = .08. Therefore, the remaining analyses collapse across 
gender. 
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Table 5.3: Means (standard deviations) for dependent variables by gender and facial stimulus type 
 
            
    Dependent Variable   
Facial      
Stimulus Gender 
1st Fixation 
Time Run Count Dwell Time 
1st Run Dwell 
Time 
      
Angry 
(with Men 795.38 (212.10) 1.42 (.36) 1240.37 (173.11) 998.45 (291.85) 
Happy)      
 Women 711.20 (185.92) 1.49 (.28) 1179.07 (136.00) 896.42 (189.78) 
      
 Total 750.81 (201.94) 1.46 (.32) 1207.92 (156.68) 944.43 (247.06) 
      
Angry 
(with Men 726.61 (219.31) 1.46 (.31) 1329.48 (175.70) 1080.65 (273.34) 
Neutral)      
 Women 664.58 (195.11) 1.47 (.30) 1252.58 (132.57) 999.64 (253.63) 
      
 Total 694.15 (208.12) 1.46 (.30) 1289.24 (158.49) 1038.26 (264.80) 
      
Happy 
(with Men 776.20 (238.55) 1.46 (.37) 1205.88 (157.00) 938.62 (248.02) 
Angry)      
 Women 714.87 (193.22) 1.52 (.31) 1204.38 (133.84) 902.73 (241.46) 
      
 Total 744.11 (216.92) 1.49 (.34) 1205.10 (144.47) 919.84 (243.83) 
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Happy 
(with Men 763.78 (260.46) 1.48 (.32) 1303.91 (178.91) 1018.96 (260.25) 
Neutral)      
 Women 683.95 (167.39) 1.52 (.29) 1248.05 (111.91) 930.50 (229.22) 
      
 Total 722.01 (219.17) 1.50 (.30) 1274.68 (149.44) 972.67 (247.07) 
      
Neutral 
(with Men 873.20 (242.72) 1.41 (.36) 1106.55 (166.02) 870.43 (245.28) 
Angry)      
 Women 806.57 (190.99) 1.50 (.31) 1133.37 (124.16) 816.98 (210.61) 
      
 Total 838.34 (218.47) 1.46 (.34) 1120.59 (145.37) 842.46 (228.02) 
      
Neutral 
(with Men 839.60 (249.17) 1.44 (.33) 1133.42 (158.61) 876.69 (256.49) 
Happy)      
 Women 746.04 (172.99) 1.49 (.31) 1143.47 (114.79) 870.85 (202.70) 
      
  Total 790.65 (216.51) 1.47 (.32) 1138.68 (136.69) 873.64 (228.55) 
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5.8. Hypothesis-Specific Analyses 
Presented below are the analyses relevant to the specific hypotheses of the study. 
The analyses include significance tests and calculations of effect size (i.e., partial η2) and 
power for each test of a specific research hypothesis.  
For each hypothesis, a 2 X 2 X 6 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was 
conducted. Trait social anxiety (high and low) and speech condition (speech or no 
speech) served as between group independent variables. Facial stimulus type (neutral 
paired with angry; neutral paired with happy; angry paired with neutral; angry paired 
with happy; happy paired with neutral; or happy paired with angry) served as a within 
group independent variable. Negative affect served as a covariate. Each analysis differs 
only by the dependent variable (unless otherwise specified). 
Each analysis used the PANAS-NA, a measure of negative affect, as a covariate. 
Table 5.4 contains the group means and standard deviations for the PANAS-NA 
completed during phase 2 of the study. Table 5.5 contains the correlations between 
PANAS-NA and the dependent variables used in the analyses presented below.  
5.9. First Fixation Time  
Table 5.6 contains the means and standard deviations for first fixation time. 
Results were contrary to the hypothesis that individuals in the high trait social anxiety 
group would fixate more quickly on threatening stimuli than individuals in the low trait 
social anxiety group. There was a significant interaction between facial stimulus type and 
trait social anxiety, F(5, 400) = 2.41, p = .04. However, LSD follow-up analyses of cell 
means (minimum mean difference = 58.06) indicated that high and low trait social 
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Table 5.4: Means (standard deviations) for Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-
Negative Affect (PANAS-NA) by trait social anxiety and speech condition 
      
Social Anxiety 
Group 
Speech 
Condition PANAS-NA 
   
High Speech 21.30 (5.86) 
   
 No Speech 21.45 (6.71) 
   
 Combined 21.38 (6.22) 
   
Low Speech 16.58 (5.47) 
   
 No Speech 14.74 (3.35) 
   
 Combined 15.61 (4.52) 
   
Combined Speech 18.73 (6.07) 
   
 No Speech 17.60 (6.01) 
   
  Combined 18.14 (6.03) 
 
Table 5.5: Correlations between Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Negative Affect 
(PANAS-NA) and the dependent variables 
      
Dependent Variable 
Correlation with PANAS-
NA P 
   
Dwell Time: Angry paired with Happy -0.003 .98 
   
Dwell Time: Angry paired with Neutral -0.03 .75 
   
Dwell Time: Happy paired with Angry -0.03 .82 
   
Dwell Time: Happy paired with Neutral -0.12 .26 
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Dwell time: Neutral paired with Angry -0.01 .90 
   
Dwell time: Neutral paired with Happy 0.08 .47 
   
First fixation time: Angry paired with Happy 0.10 .36 
   
First fixation time: Angry paired with Neutral -0.01 .96 
   
First fixation time: Happy paired with Angry 0.01 .92 
   
First fixation time: Happy paired with Neutral -0.11 .32 
   
First fixation time: Neutral paired with Angry -0.02 .89 
   
First fixation time: Neutral paired with Happy -0.03 .76 
   
First run dwell time: Angry paired with Happy 0.02 .87 
   
First run dwell time: Angry paired with Neutral -0.04 .71 
   
First run dwell time: Happy paired with Angry -0.05 .65 
   
First run dwell time: Happy paired with Neutral -0.02 .83 
   
First run dwell time: Neutral paired with Angry -0.01 .93 
   
First run dwell time: Neutral paired with Happy -0.06 .57 
   
Run count Angry paired with Happy -0.02 .85 
   
Run count: Angry paired with Neutral 0.01 .97 
   
Run count: Happy paired with Angry -0.01 .91 
   
Run count: Happy paired with Neutral -0.05 .67 
   
Run count: Neutral paired with Angry -0.03 .79 
   
Run count: Neutral paired with Happy 0.03 .82 
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anxiety groups did not differ with regard to the first fixation time on the angry faces. 
Partial η2 for this effect was .03 and power was 76.04%. Of note, high and low trait social 
anxiety participants exhibited differences with regard to first fixation time on neutral 
faces (paired with angry faces) as well as happy faces (paired with angry faces). 
Specifically, low trait social anxiety participants were slower to fixate on the non-angry 
faces (in trials than contained angry faces) than high trait social anxiety participants. This 
pattern is consistent with the idea that the high trait social anxiety participants avoid 
threatening stimuli. No other differences emerged between the groups. Figure 5.2 depicts 
the pattern of this interaction (note: Displayed means are not corrected for negative 
affect). 
Although the interaction between speech condition and facial stimulus type was 
not significant, F(5, 400) = 1.97, p = .08, planned comparisons were conducted to 
examine the hypothesis that individuals in the speech condition would fixate more 
quickly on emotional stimuli than individuals in the no speech condition. LSD follow-up 
analyses of the cell means (minimum mean difference = 58.06) indicated that the speech 
groups did not differ with regard to the first fixation time on any facial stimulus type. 
Partial η2 for this effect was .02 and power was 66.40%. 
There was not a significant main effect of trait social anxiety, F(1, 80) = 1.08, p = 
.30, speech condition, F(1, 80) = .21, p = .65, facial stimulus type, F(5, 400) = .99, p = 
.42, or negative affect, F(1, 80) = .18, p = .68.  
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Table 5.6: Means (standard deviations) for first fixation time by trait social anxiety group, speech condition, and facial stimulus type 
                
  Trial Type 
        
Social 
Anxiety 
Group 
 Angry-Happy Angry-Neutral Happy-Neutral 
Speech       
Condition Angry Happy Angry Neutral Happy Neutral 
        
High Speech 759.00 673.23 723.01 759.50 699.28 746.09 
  (234.99) (209.99) (262.92) (210.66) (227.52) (209.63) 
        
 
No 
Speech 764.11 717.92 679.57 862.46 710.18 777.96 
  (200.99) (195.17) (200.10) (220.33) (247.61) (185.61) 
        
 Combined 761.42 694.40 702.43 808.27 704.44 761.19 
  (216.62) (201.64) (233.19) (218.65) (234.06) (196.61) 
        
Low Speech 785.36 850.09 726.65 869.47 788.44 826.89 
  (202.48) (203.29) (155.09) (164.13) (163.03) (245.09) 
        
 
No 
Speech 700.90 730.06 661.80 866.21 690.59 809.62 
  (173.94) (226.93) (209.23) (260.54) (239.86) (221.88) 
        
 Combined 742.23 788.80 693.53 867.80 738.48 818.07 
  (191.20) (221.79) (185.65) (216.40) (209.58) (231.13) 
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Combined Speech 773.10 767.83 724.96 818.32 746.97 789.31 
  (215.95) (222.63) (209.99) (193.04) (198.41) (230.23) 
        
 
No 
Speech 727.99 724.83 669.41 864.60 698.99 796.05 
  (186.35) (211.47) (203.08) (241.27) (240.40) (205.31) 
        
 Combined 750.81 746.60 697.511 841.19 723.26 792.64 
    (201.94) (216.97) (206.99) (218.15) (220.17) (217.00) 
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Figure 5.2: First fixation time by trait social anxiety group and facial stimulus 
type 
There were no significant two-way interactions between trait social anxiety and 
speech condition, F(1, 80) = 1.36, p = .25, facial stimulus type and negative affect, F(5, 
400) = 1.29, p = .27, facial stimulus type and trait social anxiety, F(5, 400) = 2.41, p = 
.04, or facial stimulus type and speech condition, F(5, 400) = 1.97, p = .08. 
The three-way interaction between trait social anxiety, speech condition, and 
facial stimulus type was not significant, F(5, 400) = .68, p = .64. 
5.10. Run Count 
Table 5.7 contains the descriptive statistics for run count.  
There was a significant interaction between speech condition and facial stimulus 
type, F(5, 400) = 3.10, p = .01. Partial η2 for this effect was .04 and power was 87.40%. 
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LSD follow-up analyses of the cell means (minimum mean difference = .06) indicated 
that the no speech group returned their attention to the happy face in happy-angry trials 
less often than the speech group. On neutral-happy trials, the no speech group returned 
their attention more often to the neutral face than the speech group. No other differences 
emerged between the speech groups. Figure 5.3 depicts the pattern of this interaction 
(note: Displayed means are not corrected for negative affect).  
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Figure 5.3: Run count by speech condition and facial stimulus type 
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Table 5.7: Means (standard deviations) for run count by trait social anxiety group, speech condition, and facial stimulus type 
                
  Trial Type 
        
Social 
Anxiety 
Group 
 Angry-Happy Angry-Neutral Happy-Neutral 
Speech       
Condition Angry Happy Angry Neutral Happy Neutral 
        
High Speech 1.53 (.34) 1.56 (.37) 1.54 (.35) 1.55 (.36) 1.58 (.32) 1.50 (.34) 
        
 
No 
Speech 1.37 (.29) 1.43 (.29) 1.44 (.27) 1.40 (.32) 1.47 (.32) 1.47 (.30) 
        
 Combined 1.46 (.33) 1.50 (.34) 1.49 (.31) 1.48 (.34) 1.53 (.32) 1.48 (.32) 
        
Low Speech 1.35 (.24) 1.46 (.29) 1.34 (.23) 1.41 (.30) 1.38 (.21) 1.35 (.29) 
        
 
No 
Speech 1.56 (.36) 1.49 (.37) 1.50 (.31) 1.46 (.37) 1.55 (.33) 1.53 (.33) 
        
 Combined 1.46 (.32) 1.47 (.33) 1.43 (.29) 1.44 (.33) 1.47 (.29) 1.44 (.32) 
        
Combined Speech 1.44 (.30) 1.50 (.33) 1.43 (.30) 1.47 (.33) 1.47 (.28) 1.42 (.32) 
        
 
No 
Speech 1.48 (.34) 1.48 (.33) 1.48 (.30) 1.44 (.35) 1.52 (.33) 1.50 (.31) 
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  Combined 1.45 (.32) 1.48 (.33) 1.46 (.30) 1.46 (.34) 1.49 (.30) 1.46 (.32) 
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There were no other significant effects. The main effects of trait social anxiety, 
F(1, 80) = .63, p = .43, speech condition, F(1, 80) = .01, p = .94, negative affect, F(1, 80) 
= .35, p = .56, and facial stimulus type, F(5, 400) = 1.48, p = .20, were not significant.    
 The two-way interactions between trait social anxiety and speech condition, F(1, 
80) = 3.47, p = .07, facial stimulus type and negative affect, F(5, 400) = 1.12, p = .35, and 
facial stimulus type and trait social anxiety, F(5, 400) = 1.19, p = .31, were not 
significant. 
 The three-way interaction between trait social anxiety, speech condition, and 
facial stimulus type was not significant, F(5, 400) = 1.95, p = .09. 
5.10a. Run count bias  
In order to test the hypothesis that individuals in the high trait social anxiety 
group would return their attention more often to threatening stimuli than individuals in 
the low trait social anxiety group during the first 1000 ms of each trial, but that they 
would fixate a lesser amount of the time during the last 2000 ms of each trial, a new 
dependent variable was calculated. The standard run count variable for the first 1000 ms 
and the last 2000 ms of the trial are not comparable because the time in which the 
behaviors can occur in each time frame differs. In order to adjust for differences in timing 
between the variables collected in the first 1000 and the last 2000 ms of the trials, run 
count bias was calculated by dividing the run count for the angry face by the run count 
for the non-angry face on the trials that contained an angry face. Scores with an absolute 
value greater than 1 on the run count bias variable indicate a bias towards more fixations 
on the angry face. Scores were calculated for the first 1000 ms and the last 2000 ms of 
each trial. Table 5.8 contains the means and standard deviations for run count bias.  
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Table 5.8: Means (standard deviations) for run count bias by trait social anxiety group, 
speech condition, trial type, and trial time 
            
  Trial Type 
      
Social 
Anxiety 
Group 
 Angry-Happy Angry-Neutral 
Speech     
Condition 1000 2000 1000 2000 
      
High Speech .98 (.21) 1.07 (.26) 1.06 (.21) 1.00 (.34) 
      
 
No 
Speech .99 (.22) 1.01 (.50) 1.32 (.45) .89 (.33) 
      
 Combined .98 (.21) 1.04 (.39) 1.18 (.37) .94 (.34) 
      
Low Speech 1.11 (.29) .84 (.25) 1.19 (.19) .83 (.35) 
      
 
No 
Speech 1.05 (.24) 1.15 (.43) 1.28 (.32) .89 (.25) 
      
 Combined 1.08 (.264) 1.00 (.38) 1.23 (.26) .86 (.30) 
      
Combined Speech 1.05 (.26) .94 (.28) 1.13 (.31) .90 (.35) 
      
 
No 
Speech 1.03 (.23) 1.09 (.46) 1.30 (.37) .89 (.28) 
      
  Combined 1.04 (.25) 1.01 (.39) 1.21 (.31) .90 (.32) 
 
A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed group Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted 
with trait social anxiety (high or low) and speech condition (speech or no speech) as 
between group independent variables, with trial type (angry-neutral or angry-happy) and  
trial time (first 1000 ms or last 2000 ms) as within group independent variables, with 
negative affect as a covariate, and with run count bias as the dependent variable. 
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Table 5.9 contains the correlations between run count bias for each trial type and 
trial time and the PANAS-NA. 
Table 5.9: Correlations between the PANAS-NA and run count bias for each trial type 
and trial time 
        
Trial Type 
Trial 
Time R p 
    
Angry-Happy 1000 -0.07 0.54 
    
 2000 0.01 0.93 
    
Angry-Neutral 1000 -0.13 0.24 
    
  2000 0.03 0.82 
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the interaction between trait social anxiety and trial 
time was not significant, F(1, 79) = 2.01, p = .16. Partial η2 for this effect was .03 and 
power was 28.90%. Although the interaction was not significant, planned comparisons 
were conducted to examine the hypothesis that individuals in the high trait social anxiety 
group would return their attention more often to threatening stimuli than individuals in 
the low trait social anxiety group during the first 1000 ms of each trial, but that they 
would return their attention less often to threatening stimuli during the last 2000 ms of 
each trial. LSD follow-up analyses of the cell means (minimum mean difference = .16) 
revealed no group differences. 
The main effect of speech condition was significant, F(1, 79) = 5.43, p = .02, such 
that the participants in the no speech condition returned their attention to angry faces 
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more frequently than the speech condition. Partial η2 for this effect was .06 and power 
was 63.40%.  
The main effect of speech condition was modified by the interaction between trial 
time, trait social anxiety, and speech condition, F(1, 79) = 5.74, p = .02. Partial η2 for this 
effect was .07 and power was 65.80%. LSD follow-up analyses of the cell means 
(minimum mean difference = .16) revealed that for the no speech condition, the high and 
low trait social anxiety groups did not differ with regard to run count bias for either trial 
time. For the speech condition, although the high and low trait social anxiety groups did 
not differ with regard to run count bias for the 1000 ms trial time, the high trait social 
anxiety group returned their attention to the angry faces more often than the low trait 
social anxiety group at 2000 ms. Figure 5.4 depicts the pattern of this interaction (note: 
Displayed means are corrected for negative affect). 
There were no other significant effects. The main effects of trait social anxiety, 
F(1, 79) = .004, p = .95, negative affect, F(1, 79) = .13, p = .72, trial time, F(1, 79) = 
1.33, p = .25, and trial type, F(1, 79) = 2.09, p = .15 were not significant. 
Two-way interactions between trait social anxiety and speech condition, F(1, 79) 
= 1.83, p = .18, trial time and negative affect, F(1, 79) = .01, p = .93, trial time and 
speech condition, F(1, 79) = .12, p = .73, trial type and negative affect, F(1, 79) = 1.19, p 
= .28, trial type and trait social anxiety, F(1, 79) = 2.07, p = .16, trial type and speech 
condition, F(1, 79) = .14, p = .71, and trial time and trial type, F(1, 79) = .91, p = .34, 
were not significant.  
The three way interactions between trait social anxiety, trial type, and speech 
condition, F(1, 79) = 3.24, p = .08, trial time, trial type, and negative affect, F(1, 79) = 
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 Figure 5.4: Run count bias by trait social anxiety, speech condition, and trial time 
.01, p = .94, trait social anxiety, trial time, and trial type, F(1, 79) = .01, p = .94, and 
speech condition, trial time, and trial type, F(1, 79) = 3.78, p = .06, were not significant.   
The four-way interaction between trait social anxiety, speech condition, trial time, 
and trial type was not significant, F(1, 79) = .08, p = .78. 
5.11. Dwell Time 
Table 5.10 contains the univariate statistics for dwell time.  
There were no significant effects. The main effects of trait social anxiety, F(1, 80) 
= .07, p = .80, speech condition, F(1, 80) = .23, p = .63, negative affect, F(1, 80) = .53, p 
= .47, and facial stimulus type, F(5, 400) = .84, p = .52, were not significant. 
The two-way interactions between trait social anxiety and speech condition, F(1, 
80) = .08, p = .78, facial stimulus type and negative affect, F(5, 400) = .32, p = .90, 
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Table 5.10: Means (standard deviations) for dwell time by trait social anxiety group, speech condition, and facial stimulus type 
                
  Trial Type 
        
Social 
Anxiety 
Group 
 Angry-Happy Angry-Neutral Happy-Neutral 
Speech       
Condition Angry Happy Angry Neutral Happy Neutral 
        
High Speech 1220.32 1183.45 1291.63 1182.62 1269.57 1134.22 
  (119.90) (100.36) (117.27) (121.79) (128.73) (127.47) 
        
 
No 
Speech 1207.07 1206.13 1302.81 1104.28 1243.24 1159.67 
  (119.10) (98.52) (135.71) (111.26) (138.38) (153.15) 
        
 Combined 1214.04 1194.19 1259.03 1145.51 1257.10 1146.27 
  (118.09) (98.81) (131.51) (121.97) (132.23) (138.88) 
        
Low Speech 1168.48 1242.04 1278.80 1127.46 1262.80 1146.30 
  (153.90) (145.07) (124.87) (116.70) (116.04) (106.25) 
        
 
No 
Speech 1236.03 1182.72 1343.19 1074.21 1319.25 1113.57 
  (205.25) (196.90) (212.28) (194.30) (195.16) (159.93) 
        
 Combined 1202.97 1211.75 1311.68 1100.27 1291.62 1129.59 
  (183.18) (174.21) (176.20) (161.70) (162.17) (135.87) 
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Combined Speech 1192.59 1214.79 1251.28 1153.12 1265.95 1140.68 
  (139.98) (128.28) (123.61) (121.05) (120.67) (115.33) 
        
 
No 
Speech 1223.62 1192.75 1325.89 1087.10 1286.67 1133.33 
  (172.41) (160.97) (182.55) (162.91) (175.37) (156.86) 
        
 Combined 1207.92 1203.90 1288.14 1120.49 1276.19 1137.05 
    (156.68) (144.90) (159.10) (146.23) (149.67) (136.66) 
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facial stimulus type and trait social anxiety, F(5, 400) = 1.13, p = .34, and facial stimulus 
type and speech condition, F(5, 400) = 1.99, p = .08, were not significant. 
The three-way interaction between trait social anxiety, speech condition, and 
facial stimulus type was not significant, F(5, 400) = 1.01, p = .41. 
5.11a. Dwell time bias 
In order to test the hypothesis that individuals in the high trait social anxiety 
group would spend more time examining threatening stimuli for the first 1000 ms of each 
trial than individuals in the low trait social anxiety group, but that they would spend less 
time examining the threatening stimuli during the last 2000 ms of each trial, a new 
dependent variable was calculated. The standard dwell time variable for the first 1000 ms 
and the last 2000 ms of the trial are not comparable because the time in which the 
behaviors can occur in each time frame differs. In order to adjust for differences in timing 
between the variables collected in the first 1000 and the last 2000 ms of the trials, dwell 
time bias was calculated by dividing the dwell time for the angry face by the dwell time 
for the non-angry face on the trials that contained an angry face. Scores with an absolute 
value greater than 1 on the dwell time bias variable indicate a bias towards greater dwell 
time on the angry face. Scores were calculated for the first 1000 ms and the last 2000 ms 
of each trial. Table 5.11 contains the means and standard deviations for dwell time bias.  
A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed group Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted 
with trait social anxiety (high or low) and speech condition (speech or no speech) as 
between group independent variables, with trial type (angry-neutral or angry-happy) and 
trial time (first 1000 ms or last 2000 ms) as within group independent variables, with 
negative affect as a covariate, and with dwell time bias as the dependent variable.  
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Table 5.11: Means (standard deviations) for dwell time bias by trait social anxiety group, 
speech condition, trial type, and trial time 
                
                                Trial Type 
        
Social 
Anxiety 
Group 
Speech 
Condition 
Angry-Happy Angry-Neutral  
      
  1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms 2000 ms   
        
High Speech .97 (.28) 1.14 (.36) 1.28 (.37) .98 (.25)   
        
 
No 
Speech 1.08 (.42) 1.03 (.27) 1.68 (.78) 1.08 (.29)   
        
 Combined 1.02 (.35) 1.09 (.32) 1.47 (.63) 1.03 (.27)   
        
Low Speech 1.24 (.53) .89 (.28) 1.49 (.46) 1.06 (.34)   
        
 
No 
Speech 1.08 (.37) 1.17 (.55) 1.61 (.67) 1.32 (.88)   
        
 Combined 1.16 (.45) 1.03 (.45) 1.54 (.57) 1.19 (.67)   
        
Combined Speech 1.11 (.45) 1.01 (.34) 1.39 (.43) 1.02 (.30)   
        
 
No 
Speech 1.08 (.39) 1.11 (.45) 1.64 (.71) 1.22 (.69)   
        
  Combined 1.10 (.42) 1.06 (.40) 1.52 (.60) 1.12 (.54)   
 
Contrary to the hypothesis that there would be an interaction between trial time 
and trait social anxiety group, the interaction was not significant, F(1, 79) = .03, p = .87. 
Partial η2 for this effect was less than .01 and power was 5.30%. Despite the non-
significant interaction, planned comparisons were conducted. LSD follow-up analyses of 
the cell means (minimum mean difference = .22) revealed no differences.  
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Table 5.12 contains the correlations between run count bias for each trial type and 
trial time and the PANAS-NA. 
Table 5.12: Correlations between the PANAS-NA and dwell time bias for each 
trial type and trial time 
        
Trial Type 
Trial 
Time r p 
    
Angry-Happy 1000 -0.14 0.20 
    
 2000 0.03 0.79 
    
Angry-Neutral 1000 -0.05 0.63 
    
  2000 -0.03 0.77 
 
There was a significant main effect of speech condition, F(1, 79) = 2.74, p = .04, 
on dwell time bias such that participants in the no speech condition spent more time 
examining angry faces than individuals in the speech condition. Partial η2 for this effect 
was .05 and power was 52.60%. 
There was a significant interaction between trial type and speech condition, F(1, 
79) = 4.79, p = .03. Partial η2 for this effect was .06 and power was 58.00%. LSD follow-
up analyses of the cell means (minimum mean difference = .19) indicated that for angry-
happy trials, there was no difference between participants in the speech and no speech 
condition with regard to dwell time bias on the angry faces. However, on the angry-
neutral trials, participants in the no speech condition had a greater dwell time bias on the 
angry faces than participants in the speech condition.  
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There was a significant interaction between trial time, trait social anxiety group, 
and speech condition, F(1, 79) = 6.77, p = .01. Partial η2 for this effect was .08 and power 
was 72.60%. LSD follow-up analyses of the cell means (minimum mean difference = .31) 
indicated that for high trait social anxiety participants in the speech condition, there was 
no difference between the dwell time bias on the angry face in the first 1000 ms of the 
trials and the last 2000 ms of the trials. In addition, high trait social anxiety participants in 
the no speech condition spent a greater amount of time examining angry faces in the first 
1000 ms of the trials than the last 2000 ms of the trials. The pattern is reversed for 
participants in the low trait social anxiety condition such that low trait social anxiety 
participants in the no speech condition spent an equivalent amount of time examining the 
angry faces in the first 1000 ms of the trials and the last 2000 ms of the trials. However, 
low trait social anxiety participants in the speech condition spent a greater amount of time 
examining the angry face during the first 1000 ms of the trials than the last 2000 ms of 
the trials. Figure 5.5 depicts the pattern of this interaction for high and low trait social 
anxiety participants (note: depicted means are raw means and are not adjusted for 
negative affect).  
There was not a significant main effect for trial type, F(1, 79) = .39, p = .53, trial 
time, F(1, 79) = 3.00, p = .09, negative affect, F(1, 79) = .01, p = .91, or trait social 
anxiety group, F(1, 79) = 1.38, p = .24 on dwell time bias.  
There were no significant two-way interactions between trial type and negative 
affect, F(1, 79) = .57, p = .45, trial type and trait social anxiety, F(1, 79) = 1.10, p = .30, 
trait social anxiety and speech condition, F(1, 79) = .00, p = .99, trial time and negative  
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Note: HTA = High Trait Social Anxiety; LTA = Low Trait Social Anxiety 
Figure 5.5: Dwell time bias for angry faces by trait social anxiety, speech condition, and 
trial time 
affect, F(1, 79) = .50, p = .48, trial time and speech condition, F(1, 79) = .03, p = .88, or 
trial type and trial time, F(1, 79) = .89, p = .35. 
There were no three way interactions between trial type, trait social anxiety group, 
and speech condition, F(1, 79) = .36, p = .55, trial type, trial time, and negative affect, 
F(1, 79) = .00, p = .98, trial type, trial time, and speech condition, F(1, 79) = .75, p = .39 
or  trial type, trial time, and trait social anxiety group, F(1, 79) = 1.67, p = .20.    
The four-way interaction between trial time, trial type, trait social anxiety group, 
and speech condition was not significant, F(1, 79) = .35, p = .56. 
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5.12. First Run Dwell Time 
 Table 5.13 contains descriptive statistics for first run dwell time. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that individuals with high trait social anxiety would 
spend more time attending to threatening stimuli following their first fixation on the 
threatening stimuli before viewing the other stimuli than individuals in the low trait social 
anxiety group, the interaction between trait social anxiety and facial stimulus type was 
not significant, F(5, 400) = 1.86, p = .10. Partial η2 for this effect was .02 and power was 
63.20%. Although the interaction was not significant, planned comparisons were 
conducted. LSD follow-up analyses of the cell means (minimum mean difference = 
67.264) revealed that the low trait social anxiety participants exhibited greater first run 
dwell times than the high trait social anxiety participants with regard to the angry face 
(paired with neutral) and the happy face (paired with neutral). Therefore, the hypothesis 
was not supported. Figure 5.6 depicts the interaction between trait social anxiety and 
facial stimulus type (note: Displayed means are not corrected for negative affect). 
There were no other significant effects. The main effects of trait social anxiety, 
F(1, 80) = .66, p = .42, speech condition, F(1, 80) = .03, p = .86, negative affect, F(1, 80) 
= .01, p = .91, and facial stimulus type, F(5, 400) = .39, p = .86, were not significant. 
The two-way interactions between trait social anxiety and speech condition, F(1, 
80) = 2.58, p = .11, facial stimulus type and negative affect, F(5, 400) = .52, p = .76, 
facial stimulus type and trait social anxiety, F(5, 400) = 1.86, p = .10, and facial stimulus 
type and speech condition, F(5, 400) = .90, p = .48, were not significant. 
The three-way interaction between trait social anxiety, speech condition, and 
facial stimulus type was not significant, F(5, 400) = .68, p = .64. 
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Table 5.13: Means (standard deviations) for first run dwell time by trait social anxiety group, speech condition, trial type, and trial 
time 
        
Social 
Anxiety 
Group 
 Angry-Happy Angry-Neutral Happy-Neutral 
Speech       
Condition Angry Happy Angry Neutral Happy Neutral 
        
High Speech 910.99 871.53 920.13 847.19 923.43 830.39 
  (262.63) (249.27) (256.49) (282.11) (284.22) (218.69) 
        
 
No 
Speech 998.36 928.70 1062.54 842.83 946.11 893.20 
  (216.84) (263.62) (235.63) (232.07) (241.97) (251.38) 
        
 Combined 952.37 898.61 987.59 845.13 934.18 860.14 
  (242.85) (254.31) (253.94) (256.16) (261.75) (233.67) 
        
Low Speech 981.72 982.63 1112.07 884.96 1030.68 949.64 
  (237.38) (236.75) (210.63) (201.24) (181.02) (219.25) 
        
 
No 
Speech 896.13 897.40 1059.40 805.19 987.62 826.52 
  (264.98) (237.54) (315.29) (207.62) (275.12) (224.40) 
        
 Combined 938.02 939.11 1085.18 844.23 1008.69 886.77 
  (252.84) 238.48 (267.64) (206.27) (232.36) (228.12) 
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Combined Speech 948.82 930.95 1022.79 867.39 980.80 894.17 
  (248.98) (246.19) (249.77) (239.96) (237.98) (224.58) 
        
 
No 
Speech 939.94 910.82 1060.75 821.32 969.83 855.10 
  (248.00) (246.40) (280.69) (216.49) (259.17) (235.72) 
        
 Combined 944.43 921.00 1041.55 844.63 975.38 874.86 
    (247.06) (245.04) (264.60) (228.48) (247.25) 229.62 
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Figure 5.6: First run dwell time by trait social anxiety and facial stimulus type 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the current study was to address some inconsistencies and gaps in 
the attention to threat and social anxiety literature using a methodology that allowed for a 
qualitatively different assessment of the location of visual attention and its time course 
than was used in prior studies. Specific research hypotheses were designed to: a) test the 
vigilance-avoidance hypothesis of anxiety and attention to threat, b) examine the effect of 
state anxiety on attention to emotional stimuli, and c) examine whether facilitated 
detection of threat or delayed disengagement from threat better account for the attentional 
patterns of individuals with high levels of anxiety in the presence of threatening stimuli. 
In addition to the specific hypotheses, data analysis addressed questions about whether a) 
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the observed effects of anxiety on attention to threatening and other emotional stimuli are 
specific to anxiety; or, rather, are associated with negative affect as defined more broadly, 
b) the emotional valence of the stimulus paired with the threatening stimulus affects 
attentional patterns, and c) state social anxiety, trait social anxiety, and time interact to 
predict the timing of attention to threatening stimuli. Results of the study as they related 
to each of the aforementioned areas of interest will be discussed below. Treatment 
implications, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research will also be 
discussed.  
6.1. Testing the Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis 
The vigilance-avoidance hypothesis states that anxious individuals initially orient 
towards, but subsequently avoid, highly threatening, anxiety-provoking stimuli (Mogg, 
Bradley et al., 2004). Evidence regarding the assertions of the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis appears to be mixed (e.g., Fox et al., 2000; Mogg, Bradley et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the current study was designed to test the assertions of the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis. Three hypotheses related to the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis were tested. 
The results of the tests of the hypotheses are summarized and discussed below.  
It was hypothesized that individuals in the high trait social anxiety group would 
fixate more quickly on threatening stimuli than individuals in the low trait social anxiety 
group. The data did not support this hypothesis. Interestingly, although the groups did not 
differ with regard to timing of the first fixation on angry faces, the high trait social 
anxiety group was faster to fixate on happy and neutral faces when they were paired with 
angry faces than the low trait social anxiety group. Although unexpected, the finding is 
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not necessarily inconsistent with theories of anxiety as having a threat detection function 
or the tenets of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis.  
In the current study, the dependent variables measured did not assess the timing of 
threat detection; rather, the study assessed the timing of fixations. On average, trait 
socially anxious participants made their first fixations on the angry images in the angry-
neutral trials around 700 ms after the onset of the stimuli. Detection typically occurs 
within 100 ms (Utama, Takemoto, Koike, & Nakamura, 2009). Therefore, it is likely that 
the participants detected the threatening stimuli prior to fixation and that high trait social 
anxiety participants actively avoided the angry stimuli by fixating more quickly to non-
threatening stimuli. This is consistent with the idea that high trait social anxiety 
participants are avoiding angry faces.  
It was hypothesized that individuals in the high trait social anxiety group would 
return their attention to threatening stimuli more frequently than individuals in the low 
trait social anxiety group when first presented with threat, but that they would 
subsequently fixate less frequently. Results did not support this hypothesis. Instead, the 
frequency with which participants returned their attention to angry faces did not differ by 
trait social anxiety.  
Similarly, it was hypothesized that individuals in the high trait social anxiety 
group would spend more time examining threatening stimuli when initially presented 
with it than individuals in the low trait social anxiety group, but that they would 
subsequently spend less time examining the threatening stimuli. Results did not support 
this hypothesis. In fact, no differences between high and low trait social anxiety 
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participants emerged with regard to the amount of time they spent examining facial 
stimuli.   
There were no differences between the high and low trait social anxiety groups in 
terms of how often participants returned their attention to threatening stimuli and the 
duration of the examination of the angry stimuli. The null results are not surprising 
considering the lack of consensus on the topic in the literature. For example, some studies 
have found evidence for avoidance of threatening stimuli at 500 ms following the onset 
of the stimuli (e.g., Chen et al., 2002; Vassipoulos, 2005), while some studies have found 
evidence of an attentional bias towards threat at that time point (e.g., Mogg, Philippot, et 
al., 2004, Sposari & Rapee, 2007). Furthermore, these findings are consistent with studies 
that demonstrate that anxiety does not always moderate patterns of attention to threat 
(e.g., Esteves, 1999; Fox et al., 2000).  
In general, patterns of visual attention can be influenced by a number of variables 
including the affective intensity of the stimuli. Therefore, it is possible that differences 
among the studies might be a result of seemingly minor variations in methodology. For 
example, building upon the idea that trait anxiety does not always affect attention to 
threat and the inconsistencies that exist in the literature, Wilson and MacLeod (2003) 
explored the effect of stimulus intensity on attention to threat. Participants with high or 
low trait anxiety engaged in a dot probe task during which mildly, moderately, and highly 
threatening facial stimuli were presented. The authors conclude that, consistent with 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) model of attention to threat, all people orient attention 
away from mildly threatening stimuli and toward highly threatening stimuli. However, 
whether or not someone orients attention away from moderate threat depends on the 
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person’s anxiety level; high anxious individuals orient toward it while low anxious 
individuals orient away from it. In a similar study, Mogg et al. (2007) monitored the gaze 
of participants with high and low levels of trait anxiety when presented with angry, 
fearful, and neutral facial stimuli. The angry and fearful faces varied in intensity of 
expressed emotion. Although the groups did not differ in terms of proportion of trials in 
which the initial orientation was to a mildly negative (as opposed to a neutral) facial 
stimulus, participants in the high trait anxiety group exhibited a greater vigilance for the 
more intense negative facial stimuli than participants in the low trait anxiety group. Given 
the Wilson and MacLeod (2003) and Mogg et al. (2007) studies, it is possible that results 
of the current study would have been different if the stimulus intensity were different.  
Unexpected findings concerning the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis might be 
accounted for by methodological differences between the current study and past studies 
of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis. Specifically, the majority of the research on the 
vigilance-avoidance hypothesis has been conducted using the dot probe task. The task of 
the participant in the dot probe task is to indicate the location of a probe. In contrast, the 
current study utilized a free view task in which participants were asked to examine the 
visual stimuli, but the manner in which they were to do so was not specified. Task 
differences appear to be important as task requirements have been found to have a great 
influence on visual attention (e.g., Dodd, Van der Stigchel, & Hollingworth, 2009). 
Furthermore, the dependent variables derived from the dot probe task are different from 
the dependent variables derived from the free view task of the current study. In a dot 
probe task, the location of visual attention is inferred for a specific point in time (e.g., 500 
ms following the onset of the stimulus). In contrast, eye tracking allows for the 
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determination of a variety of variables such as timing of first fixation and dwell time. The 
location of visual attention at a particular time point is not typically assessed. Therefore, 
studies that use the differing methodologies are not directly comparable.  
Currently, there are few published studies that have utilized eye tracking in the 
study of visual attention to threat and anxiety. Not surprisingly, the results of these 
studies appear to be mixed. Although the current study found that participants exhibited 
an initial avoidance followed by no attentional bias, some studies report a vigilance-
avoidance pattern. For example, results from a study of spider phobics provide evidence 
for a vigilance-avoidance pattern of visual attention (Rinck & Becker, 2006). The authors 
found that participants with a significant spider phobia spent more time examining 
images of spiders than the control participants during the first 500 ms of the trials, but 
that the groups did not differ during the next 1 second of the stimulus presentations. 
Furthermore, the spider phobia group spent less time examining the spider images than 
the control group during the remainder of the 1-minute trial. Rohner (2002) made slightly 
different conclusions. Rohner (2002) reported that both high and low trait anxiety 
participants spent more time on average examining angry faces than happy faces in the 
first second of the trial, but that during the last second of the trials, the high trait anxiety 
participants avoided the angry faces more than they did from the happy faces. The low 
trait anxiety group did not exhibit a bias in the last second of the trial. Similarly, 
Hermans, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (1999) monitored the attention of participants with 
both high and low levels of spider phobia during a task in which they were asked to view 
pictures of spider and flower stimuli simultaneously. Results suggest that both groups 
exhibited a vigilance towards the spiders initially, but that the high spider phobia group 
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avoided the spiders as trial time progressed. The low spider phobia group maintained 
their vigilance towards spiders throughout the trials.   
In contrast to Rinck and Becker (2006) and Rohner (2002), some studies report 
evidence for a vigilance-vigilance pattern of visual attention to threat. For example, 
Armstrong et al. (2010) reported that participants with high fears of contamination orient 
their attention more quickly to fearful faces and maintain their gaze on facial stimuli with 
fearful and disgusted facial expressions for longer than participants with low 
contamination fear in a free view task. Similarly, in a study examining the visual 
attention of Iraq war veterans to generally negative stimuli and Iraq-relevant negative 
stimuli in a free view task, Kimble et al. (2010) reported that veterans with greater PTSD 
symptoms spent more time examining the generally negative stimuli than veterans with 
lower levels of PTSD symptoms. Also, they reported a trend for the high PTSD group to 
fixate first on the Iraq-relevant stimuli. Consistent with evidence that participants with 
high levels of anxiety will fixate more quickly on threatening stimuli, as described above, 
Mogg et al. (2007) found that high trait anxiety participants tend to fixate first on images 
of people with negative emotional facial expressions more often than participants with 
low trait anxiety.    
There are few, if any, studies of social anxiety and the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis that utilize eye trackers. Although there has been some research on visual 
attention to threat and other anxiety disorders, more research specific to social anxiety is 
necessary because there are differences among the anxiety disorders that could influence 
visual attention to threat. As a basic example, the definition of threat, and therefore the 
operationalization of “threat,” differs among the anxiety disorders. Knowing what 
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constitutes a threat is crucial for designing studies of visual attention to it as research 
suggests that threat is disorder-specific (Hope et al., 1990). Conversely, determining 
oculomotor behavior in the presence of a given stimulus might inform our knowledge of 
what is and is not “threatening” for both the individual and people with high levels social 
anxiety. As another example, studies of visual attention to threat that use participants 
with high levels of social anxiety might be different from studies of attention to threat in 
other anxiety disorders populations because experimental procedures themselves (e.g., 
arriving for a laboratory study, performing a task in front of the researchers) can trigger 
social anxiety and possibly influence visual attention.  
In sum, the current study did not support the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis. 
Instead, it appears as though participants in the high trait social anxiety group initially 
avoided threatening stimuli, as compared to the low trait social anxiety group, but 
subsequently did not differ from the low trait social anxiety group in terms of attentional 
bias. The current study tested the tenets of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis using a 
methodology that had not been used before with a sample selected for levels of trait 
social anxiety. Methodological differences between the current study and prior studies of 
the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (i.e., dot probe studies) might account for some of the 
unexpected results of the current study, although more empirical research is necessary to 
determine which variables affect visual attention to threat for individuals with high levels 
of social anxiety.  
6.2. The Effect of State Anxiety on Attention to Emotional Stimuli 
Given the evidence that state social anxiety is associated with biased attention 
towards emotional stimuli in general (as opposed to a threat specific bias; e.g., Rutherford 
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et al., 2004), it was hypothesized that individuals in the high state anxiety group would 
fixate more quickly than individuals in the low state anxiety group on emotional stimuli 
(i.e., threatening or happy). Determining the effects of state social anxiety on patterns of 
attention to threat in particular across time is important because it has theoretical 
implications. Specifically, a number of theoretical models that explain patterns of 
attention to threat associated with anxiety posit that elevations in state social anxiety 
enhance the detection of threatening stimuli, resulting in vigilance for threat (e.g., 
Barlow, 2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Contrary to the aforementioned predictions, state social anxiety did not affect the 
speed with which participants fixated on emotional stimuli. The results are not entirely 
surprising given the inconsistencies in the literature. Specifically, some studies report no 
predictive ability of state anxiety (e.g., Pineles & Mineka, 2005), while other studies 
report that state anxiety predicts attention to emotional stimuli (e.g., MacLeod et al., 
1986). Furthermore, some studies report that state anxiety interacts with trait social 
anxiety to predict attention to emotional stimuli, although it does not predict attention to 
threat alone (e.g., Mansell et al., 1999).      
Research suggests that the results of the current study with regard to the effects of 
state social anxiety might have been different if verbal stimuli were used instead of the 
facial stimuli. An examination of the aforementioned studies that address state anxiety 
and attention to emotional stimuli suggests that the studies that include facial stimuli 
produce results that differ from studies that use verbal stimuli. Specifically, studies that 
used facial stimuli concluded that elevations in state anxiety lead individuals to avoid 
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emotional stimuli, whereas studies that used verbal stimuli concluded that elevations in 
state anxiety lead individuals to attend to emotional stimuli.  
As evidence for the importance of stimulus choice, Mansell et al. (2002) 
conducted two dot probe tasks with identical specifications except that in one task words 
were used and in the other task facial images were used as stimuli. Trait social anxiety 
predicted the avoidance of threatening stimuli when the facial stimuli were used, but not 
when words were used as stimuli. Similarly, Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, and Bradley 
(2009) asked participants with high and low trait anxiety to engage in Stroop tasks in 
which participants were asked to identify the color of emotional facial stimuli or words. 
Participants with high trait anxiety exhibited a greater Stroop interference than low trait 
anxiety participants in the emotional faces were used as stimuli, but not when emotional 
words were used as stimuli. Therefore, it is possible the type of stimulus used in the 
current study influenced attentional patterns within the study.   
Stimulus intensity and saliency are two factors that could provide clarification 
concerning the causes of the attentional differences that exist between studies that use 
facial stimuli and studies that use verbal stimuli. As discussed above in the vigilance-
avoidance hypothesis section, stimulus intensity appears to be an important variable to 
consider when assessing patterns of attention to threat (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). It is 
possible that emotional facial stimuli are perceived as more intense than emotional 
words, especially within a socially anxious population, and that this difference produces 
seemingly inconsistent results across studies that use different types of stimuli. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that emotional facial information is more 
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salient and easily processed than emotional words (Beall & Herbert, 2008), which may 
lead to larger differences between studies that use different stimuli.     
In conclusion, participants with high and low state social anxiety participants did 
not differ with regard to how quickly they fixated on emotional stimuli. The results of the 
current study appear consistent with at least one prior examination of the association 
between state anxiety and attention to emotional stimuli (Pineles & Mineka, 2005), but 
inconsistent with a number of other studies (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986). Analysis of the 
pertinent research suggests that the type of stimulus used as emotional stimuli (e.g., facial 
or verbal) matters. Specifically, it appears as though when a person experiences inflated 
state anxiety, they avoid emotional facial stimuli and attend to emotional words. These 
patterns might be explained by intensity and saliency differences between the types of 
stimuli.  
6.3. Difficulty with Disengagement 
Research using dot probe tasks suggests that difficulty disengaging attention from 
threatening stimuli is associated with high trait social anxiety (e.g., Fox et al., 2002). 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with high trait social anxiety would spend 
more time attending to threatening stimuli following their first fixation on the threatening 
stimuli before viewing the other stimuli than individuals in the low trait social anxiety 
group. Results did not support the hypothesis. Instead, the data indicate that there is no 
difference between the trait social anxiety groups with regard to the amount of initial 
dwell time on angry faces for angry-happy trials, but that for angry-neutral trials, 
individuals in the low trait social anxiety group had longer initial dwell times on the 
angry face than individuals in the high trait social anxiety group.  
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Results are inconsistent with many prior studies investigating the possibility that 
individuals with high trait anxiety experience a delayed disengagement from threat. In 
particular, evidence from studies using emotional cuing paradigms (Amir et al., 2003; 
Fox et al., 2002) and at least one eye tracking study using a free-view task (i.e., Buckner 
et al., 2010) provide support for the idea that participants with high trait anxiety 
experience a delay in disengaging from threatening stimuli. As discussed previously, 
methodological differences between the current study and studies using emotional cuing 
paradigms might account for some of the inconsistencies. Although the current study and 
Buckner et al. (2010) used similar methodologies, the studies differed in the way in 
which they measured delayed disengagement from threat. In the current study, delayed 
disengagement from threat was operationalized as longer initial dwell times on the 
threatening stimuli. In contrast, Buckner et al. (2010) divided the 2,000 ms trial duration 
into four 500 ms segments. For each segment, they calculated the proportion of fixation 
time on the threatening stimulus. Then, they calculated a proportion of fixation time 
change score by subtracting the proportion of fixation time in the last 500 ms from the 
proportion of fixation time in the second 500 ms. An analysis of the differences between 
the groups in terms of change score revealed that participants with high social anxiety 
reduced their proportion of fixation scores more slowly than participants with low social 
anxiety. Therefore, the Buckner et al. (2010) conceptualization of delayed disengagement 
is not directly comparable to the conceptualization of delayed disengagement in the 
current study. Buckner et al. (2010) emphasizes longer term changes in attention than the 
current study.  
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6.4. Facilitated Detection versus Delayed Disengagement: Explained by Attentional 
Control?  
 There has been debate about whether the vigilance to threat pattern associated 
with anxiety is better accounted for by facilitated detection of threat or delayed 
disengagement from threat. On the one hand, visual search tasks tend to demonstrate that 
high social anxiety participants detect threat more quickly than low social anxiety 
participants (e.g., Juth et al., 2005; Veljaca & Rapee, 1998; for exceptions see Esteves, 
1999 and Fox et al., 2000). On the other hand, emotional cuing tasks (Amir et al., 2003; 
Fox et al., 2002) and at least one eye tracking study (Buckner et al., 2010) provide 
evidence for delayed disengagement from threat. The results from the current study 
provide evidence that high anxiety participants do not experience difficulty disengaging 
from threat. Given the mixed empirical evidence involved in the debate, it is unlikely that 
the field will come to a consensus soon. Fortunately, some researchers have conducted 
studies aimed at better understanding the causes of the observed patterns of attention 
associated with anxiety.   
Although many researchers contributing to the debate about facilitated detection 
of threat and delayed disengagement from threat have traditionally designed their studies 
to discover which mechanism better accounts for attentional patterns in an all-or-nothing 
manner, it is possible that both processes contribute to the patterns observed within a high 
social anxiety population. Furthermore, it is possible that a common mechanism is 
responsible for occurrence of both patterns, and, therefore, the maintenance of social 
anxiety. Empirical evidence suggests that differences in attentional control processes 
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between anxious and non-anxious individuals might lead to both of the observed 
differences in visual attention patterns.  
In a recent study (Klumpp & Amir, 2010), socially anxious participants were 
randomly assigned to engage in one of three attention training tasks to manipulate 
attention a) towards threat, b) away from threat, or c) towards threat and neutral with 
equal frequency (control). Following attention training, participants completed a speech 
task. Participants who were trained to attend to threat or away from threat reported less 
anxiety than participants in the control condition. Results suggest that cognitive control 
difficulties in general might play a causal mechanism in the maintenance of anxiety.  
A number of studies of attention are consistent with the Klumpp and Amir (2010) 
findings. For example, research on basic attentional processes suggests that individuals 
with high social anxiety exhibit a greater vigilance for salient stimuli (including non-
emotional stimuli) than individuals with lower social anxiety (Moriya & Tanno, 2009). 
This research suggests that, consistent with Klumpp and Amir (2010), anxiety is 
associated with cognitive control difficulties. Furthermore, attentional control abilities 
appear to mediate the relationship between attention to threat and anxiety. As a 
demonstration of this idea, Derryberry and Reed (2002) found that, in general, high trait 
anxiety participants exhibit an early bias towards threat (assessed at 250 ms after the 
onset of the threatening stimulus), but that whether the participant exhibits a bias towards 
threat later (500 ms after the onset of the threatening stimulus) depends on attentional 
control. High anxiety participants with high attentional control avoid threatening stimuli 
at 500 ms, but high anxiety participants with low attentional control attend to threatening 
stimuli at 500 ms. Similarly, Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2009) used an emotional Stroop task 
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with emotional faces tinted with varying colors as stimuli to assess interference from 
emotional non-relevant stimuli. They reported a greater emotional Stroop interference for 
participants with high trait anxiety and low attentional control than other participants. 
Participants with low trait anxiety (regardless of attentional control) and participants with 
high trait anxiety and high attentional control exhibited a smaller interference than the 
high trait anxiety and low attentional control group.  
In sum, anxiety might be associated with both facilitated detection of and delayed 
disengagement from threat. It is possible that both patterns of attention are the result of a 
common mechanism. Specifically, it is possible that attentional control differences 
between high and low trait social anxiety individuals produce both patterns and are 
important for the maintenance of social anxiety.  
6.5. Are Attention Patterns Unique to Anxiety? 
There is strong research support for the idea that anxiety is associated with 
attention to threatening stimuli, whereas depressive symptoms are more strongly 
associated with attention to dysphoric imagery. Evidence for this assertion comes from 
studies using both eye tracking (Kellough et al., 2008) and dot probe (Gotlib et al., 2004; 
Bradley et al., 1998) methodologies. In the current study, trait and state anxiety groups 
were used as the independent variables in statistical analyses that controlled for the 
effects of negative affect on attention to emotional stimuli. None of the main effects of 
negative affect were significant in the analyses reported in the current paper. These 
results are not surprising given that the majority of the hypotheses concerned attention to 
threat and that prior research suggests that general negative affect does not predict 
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attention to threat. Results of the current study appear to support the idea that anxiety 
specifically, and not negative affect in general, affects patterns of attention to threat.  
6.6. The Emotional Valence of the Stimulus Paired with Threat 
The majority of studies of anxiety and attention to threat present threatening and 
neutral stimuli simultaneously in order to measure attentional bias (e.g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002; Vassilopoulos, 2005). As a result, little is known about attentional 
patterns of anxious individuals when threatening stimuli are paired with other emotional 
stimuli. In general, results of the current study suggest that the emotional valence of the 
stimulus paired with threat affects attentional patterns towards threat.  
Trait social anxiety appears to interact with the emotional valence of the stimulus 
paired with threat to produce variations in the duration of the first fixation on angry faces. 
When an angry face is paired with a neutral face, the low trait social anxiety participants 
exhibit longer dwell times the first time they fixate on the angry face than high trait social 
anxiety participants. In contrast, on angry-happy trials, there is no difference between the 
trait social anxiety groups with regard to the duration of their first fixation on the angry 
face.  
State social anxiety interacts with the emotional valence of the stimulus paired 
with threat to produce variations in dwell time on threatening stimuli and the number of 
times participants returned their attention to threatening stimuli. On angry-neutral trials, 
the low state social anxiety participants exhibited greater dwell times on the angry face 
than the high state social anxiety participants. Differences between the groups did not 
emerge with regard to dwell time on angry-happy trials. On angry-happy trials, low state 
social anxiety participants returned their attention to the happy faces less than the high 
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state social anxiety participants. There were no differences between the groups with 
regard to this variable on angry-neutral trials.  
In general, the way in which trait and state social anxiety interact with the type of 
stimulus paired with threat to produce attentional patterns is mostly consistent with 
evidence that anxiety affects attention to threatening stimuli when paired with neutral 
stimuli (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 2005) and that individuals, regardless of state or trait 
anxiety, are more vigilant for emotional faces than neutral faces (Holmes, Bradley, 
Nielsen, & Mogg, 2009). As discussed previously, high trait and state social anxiety 
participants exhibited avoidance of threatening stimuli when the threatening stimuli were 
paired with neutral stimuli (as evidenced by first run dwell time and dwell time, 
respectively). However, when the threatening stimuli were paired with positive stimuli, 
the tendency for emotional faces in general to capture attention likely counteracted the 
tendency for low trait and state social anxiety participants to attend to the threatening 
stimuli because both the positive and threatening stimuli are emotional.  
These results are consistent with Becker (2010) who reported that attention 
(regardless of a participant’s anxiety) does not reliably follow a particular stimulus when 
threatening and positive stimuli are paired. Furthermore, Becker (2010) explained that 
attention does not reliably follow either positive or neutral stimuli when these types of 
stimuli are paired either, although attention follows threatening stimuli when paired with 
a neutral stimulus. As a result, Becker (2010) proposes that attentional patterns in the 
presence of paired threatening and positive stimuli are not predictable based on 
knowledge of how they affect attention in the presence of neutral stimuli alone.   
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The current study suggests that the emotional valence of the stimulus paired with 
the threatening stimulus affects attentional patterns towards threat in terms of first run 
dwell time and total dwell time. In general, the pattern of results is consistent with 
empirical data suggesting that anxiety determines patterns of attention to threatening 
stimuli when the threatening stimuli are paired with neutral stimuli (e.g., Vassilopoulos, 
2005) and that individuals, regardless of state or trait anxiety, are more vigilant for 
emotional faces than neutral faces (Holmes et al., 2009). As an exception to these trends, 
differences between high and low state social anxiety groups with regard to run count 
emerged on happy-angry trials, but not on the neutral-angry trials. Given the paucity of 
research in the area of anxiety and attention to positive stimuli, more research is needed 
to validate the results of the current study.    
6.7. Do Trait Social Anxiety, State Social Anxiety, and Time Interact to Predict Attention 
to Threat? 
A number of studies suggest that trait social anxiety differentially affects patterns 
of attention to threat across time (e.g., Mogg, Bradley et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005). 
Although there are some studies that examine the influence of a socially threatening 
situation on patterns of attention to threat (e.g., Mansell et al., 2002), few studies (if any) 
have examined the effects of state social anxiety across time or how it interacts with trait 
social anxiety across time to predict patterns of attention to threat. It is important to 
determine how anxiety-provoking situations can influence the effect of trait social 
anxiety on attention to threat across time to further refine our theories of the relationship 
between anxiety and attention to threat.       
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The interaction between trait social anxiety, state social anxiety, and time was a 
significant predictor of both dwell time and run count (the number of times attention 
returned to a particular stimulus). Timing did not influence either variable with regard to 
angry faces for high trait social anxiety participants in the speech condition. In contrast, 
high trait social anxiety participants in the no speech condition exhibited a vigilance-
avoidance pattern such that they spent a greater amount of time examining the angry face 
and returning their attention to the angry during the first 1000 ms than in the last 2000 ms 
of each trial. The pattern is reversed for participants in the low trait social anxiety 
condition. Specifically, timing did not influence either variable with regard to the angry 
faces for low trait social anxiety participants in the no speech condition; however, for low 
trait social anxiety participants in the speech condition, timing was important. Low trait 
social anxiety participants in the speech condition spent a greater amount of time 
examining the angry faces and returning their attention to the angry faces during the first 
1000 ms of the trials than the last 2000 ms of the trials.  
More concisely, timing was not important for participants in either of the extreme 
conditions (i.e., high or low state and trait anxiety) as their vigilance towards threat (or 
lack thereof) remained constant. Relative to each other, the high state and trait social 
anxiety group remained avoidant across time whereas the low state and trait social 
anxiety group remained vigilant across time. For participants in the other two groups, 
timing was important. In fact, both of the non-extreme conditions showed a similar 
vigilance-avoidance pattern. Analyzed differently, there appears to be one group during 
each time point that deviates from the other three groups. In the first 1000 ms, the high 
trait social anxiety participants in the speech condition exhibit less of a bias towards 
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threat than the other groups. In the last 2000 ms, the low trait social anxiety participants 
in the no speech condition exhibit a greater bias towards threat than the other groups.   
Theoretically, individuals with high trait and state social anxiety should exhibit 
vigilance for threatening information (e.g., Barlow, 2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). This was not the case. It is possible that the combination of a 
high baseline trait anxiety and an impending threat might have caused participants in the 
high trait and state social anxiety condition to reach an intensity of anxiety at which 
avoidance is a more adaptive mechanism. Alternatively, consistent with Clark and Wells 
(1995), it is possible that when social anxiety is elevated, the individual experiencing the 
anxiety focuses more on internal, as opposed to external, threat cues. Although the 
mechanism that produced these patterns is unknown, the current study implies that trait 
and state social anxiety as well as timing are important variables to assess when studying 
the effect of anxiety on attention to threat.    
6.8. Treatment Implications 
There are effective interventions for social anxiety disorder (Chambless & Hope, 
1996; Fedoroff & Taylor, 2001; Feske & Chambless, 1995; Hofmann & Smits, 2008; 
Norton & Price, 2007; Powers et al., 2008; Taylor, 1996); however, both psychosocial 
and psychopharmacological treatments result in significant numbers of treatment non-
responders (Heimberg et al., 1998). The results of the current study have implications for 
improving treatments for social anxiety disorder in terms of timing of attentional 
manipulations and the types of stimuli used.  
The current study most directly informs the attention modification based 
treatments for social anxiety disorder. A number of studies (e.g., Amir et al., 2008; 
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Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Li et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2009) have demonstrated the 
utility of attention modification programs in decreasing social anxiety. Many of these 
attention training programs are based on the idea that individuals with social anxiety 
attend to threatening stimuli (when paired with neutral or positive stimuli) approximately 
500 ms following the onset of the threatening stimulus. 
Based on the idea that it might be beneficial for individuals with high trait social 
anxiety to attend to threat in a way that is more similar to the way in which individuals 
with low social anxiety attend to threat, the current study would suggest two 
enhancements of attention modification programs. First, the study suggests that attention 
modification programs should attend to the manipulation of first fixation on neutral 
stimuli. Specifically, the speed with which high trait social anxiety participants fixate on 
a neutral stimulus when that stimulus is paired with a threatening stimulus, should be 
slower. However, this suggestion seems to conflict with the findings that the existing 
programs that direct attention towards neutral stimuli at 500 ms are effective . Second, 
the study suggests that attention modification programs should manipulate the duration of 
the first fixation on the threatening stimulus such that the duration is greater.          
Although the development of attention modification programs have traditionally 
focused on the manipulation of attention away from threat, at least one study (Klumpp & 
Amir, 2010) suggests that it is attentional control, and not attention towards or away from 
threat per se, that affects anxiety. This study is consistent with research suggesting that 
attentional control moderates the relationship between anxiety and attention to threat 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2009). Furthermore, attention to 
emotional stimuli appears to be a “top-down” (i.e., not automatic) process (Pessoa, 
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Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002) under the control of the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010). The lack of automaticity 
involved in attention to emotional stimuli might render resulting patterns more 
susceptible to change. Given this evidence, trainings designed to improve attentional 
control might be a useful adjunct to (if not a replacement for) existing attention 
modification programs.  
It is possible that existing attention modification programs would be improved if 
the programs included efforts at increasing the duration of the initial fixations on angry 
stimuli. Additionally, attempts to modify basic attentional control capabilities might 
result in greater anxiety reductions. The most effective ways to manipulate attention as 
described above have yet to be determined. In fact, recent research suggests that attention 
modification training programs that use modified dot probe tasks affect subsequent 
attentional bias towards threat only when attention is manipulated later than 100 ms 
following the onset of the threatening stimuli (Koster, Baert, Bockstaele, & De Raedt, 
2010). Therefore, it is unclear how early attention can be manipulated to produce 
subsequent changes in attention towards threat. Ultimately, more empirical research is 
necessary to determine the characteristics of the most efficacious attentional modification 
training programs.   
6.9. Limitations 
 The results of the current study should be interpreted in light of the study’s 
limitations. Potential limitations of the current study include the use of a non-clinical 
sample,the use of angry faces as threatening stimuli, the short trial duration, and the 
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possibility that state anxiety was elevated in the sample. These potential limitations are 
discussed below.  
In general, the use of a non-clinical sample in social anxiety research does not 
appear to be problematic given that primarily non-clinical samples have been used in the 
past to study attention to threat (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998), thus facilitating the 
comparison between the results of the proposed studies and prior studies. Furthermore, 
the experience of transient social anxiety is thought to differ quantitatively, not 
qualitatively, from the experience of individuals with social anxiety disorder (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Finally, the effect size associated with threat-related attentional biases 
does not differ significantly between participants diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and 
high anxiety, non-clinical participants (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Of course, replication of 
the current study with a social anxiety disorder sample would provide better evidence of 
the similarities between the clinical and non-clinical social anxiety samples.  
Although many studies of attention to threat and social anxiety have used angry 
faces as threatening stimuli, recent evidence suggests that disgust faces might be more 
threatening to individuals with high social anxiety. Amir, Najmi, Bomyea, and Burns 
(2010) asked participants to rate the negativity of both angry and disgust faces. Although 
participants with high general anxiety and non-anxious controls did not rate the stimulus 
types differently, participants with high social anxiety rated the disgust faces as more 
negative than the angry faces. Despite the differences in severity, the use of disgust faces 
as threatening stimuli appears to have produced results consistent with similar studies that 
used angry faces as threatening stimuli (e.g., Buckner et al., 2010). Future research 
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should investigate whether the use of disgust faces produces any results that are 
important and different than the results produced using angry faces.      
 The three-second duration of the trials might have limited the results of this 
dissertation, especially as the results relate to the dwell time and run count variables. The 
three-second duration of the trials provided a small time frame within which the assessed 
behaviors could occur. This limitation is especially salient for the run count variable. On 
average, participants were only able to return their attention to each stimuli less than two 
times. If given more time to examine the stimuli, it is possible that greater differences 
would have emerged between the conditions.   
 Finally, it is possible that the sample, regardless of speech condition, was 
experiencing elevated state anxiety during the experiment. Prior to the manipulation of 
state anxiety (i.e., the speech manipulation), all participants completed the informed 
consent form. The informed consent indicated that the participants might be asked to 
engage in a speech task. Many participants reported their desire to be assigned to the no 
speech condition, suggesting that they were worrying about the possibility of being 
assigned to the speech condition. It is possible that the anxiety of participants in the no 
speech condition did not completely return to baseline following their assignment, thus 
reducing the difference between the speech and no speech conditions with regard to state 
anxiety. Future research might benefit from a manipulation of state anxiety that limits the 
potential for participants in the low state anxiety condition to experience elevated state 
anxiety. 
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6.10. Future Research 
 The current dissertation highlights the need for future research in the area of 
social anxiety and attentional patterns in the presence of threatening stimuli. It is difficult 
to make comparisons between the current study and studies in the area using other 
methodologies (e.g., dot probe, emotional Stroop) due to differences in assessed 
dependent variables and tasks. Conducting more studies using eye tracking would result 
in a greater understanding of the relationship between social anxiety and attention to 
threat as eye tracking allows researchers to examine attention in a way that is different, 
albeit complementary, to methods of attentional assessment. Also, the recent literature 
exploring attentional control and social anxiety (e.g., Klumpp & Amir, 2010) should be 
expanded. This emerging body of literature highlights the importance of assessing basic 
attentional capacities in the process of studying anxiety and attention. Furthermore, future 
research is necessary to determine how to best improve attentional control to result in 
decreases in anxiety.  
Most importantly, researchers should continue to adapt attentional modification 
training programs based on both the empirical and theoretical literature and to test 
empirically the efficacy of these programs. Differences among training programs in terms 
of affective type and intensity of the stimuli used, timing of the attentional modifications, 
the way in which attention is modified, and whether the programs are conducted while 
the patient is experiencing high or low state anxiety might produce efficacy differences 
among the programs.   
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6.11. Conclusion 
 The current dissertation explored many questions arising from the social anxiety 
and attention to threat literature. The study did not support the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis in the expected manner. Instead, it appears as though high trait social anxiety 
participants were faster to fixate on neutral stimuli paired with threatening stimuli. No 
differences between high and low trait social anxiety participants with regard to speed of 
first fixation on threatening stimuli emerged. Similarly, there no differences between the 
trait social anxiety groups with regard to the number of times their attention returned to, 
the initial dwell time on, or the total dwell time on the threatening stimuli. Results are 
consistent with a pattern in which high social anxiety participants are initially aware of, 
but actively avoid, threatening stimuli. State social anxiety did not predict how quickly 
fixations on emotional stimuli occurred. Furthermore, the study did not support the idea 
that participants with high trait social anxiety experience a delay in disengagement from 
threat. In fact, results suggest that low trait social anxiety participants exhibited longer 
initial dwell times on threatening stimuli.  
Inconsistencies between the current study and prior studies in the area can be (at 
least partially) explained by methodological differences between the studies. Future 
research in the area is important for a better understanding of the intricacies of the way in 
which individuals with high social anxiety attend to threat and for the development of 
more effective treatments for social anxiety disorder.    
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